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Lay Judge and Victim Participation in
Japan: Japan’s Saiban’in Trial, the
Prosecution Review Commission, and the
Public Prosecution of White-Collar Crimes
HIROSHI FUKURAI*
Abstract
In September 2019, the University of California Hastings Law School
hosted a symposium on Japan’s newly instituted public and victim
participation systems in the criminal process. This paper addresses themes
raised by five scholars' presentations at the symposium, covering the
effectiveness and impact of three different newly adopted systems of lay and
victim participation in Japan: (1) the new 2009 law of the Prosecution
Review Commission (PRC), a Japanese-style “civil grand jury” originally
introduced in 1948, which gave the PRC the power to force the prosecution
of formerly unindicted cases, thereby challenging and reversing the
prosecutor’s original non-prosecution decision; (2) a mixed tribunal called
“Saiban’in Seido” introduced in 2009, a quasi-jury panel of three
professional and six lay judges in the adjudication of violent and serious
criminal offenses; and (3) the victim participation program implemented in
2008, in which crime victims and their proxies were allowed to express their
opinions and grievances during the criminal justice process. This paper also
explores alternative trial venues through which the adjudication of whitecollar crime may possibly take place, including a new mixed tribunal, as well
as the all-citizen, 12-member jury trial.1 While Japan’s Jury Law was
suspended in 1943, its legal provision still exists as part of today’s criminal
law, and public efforts have been underway to “unsuspend” and bring back
the Jury Law in Japan. Also discussed in this paper is the “revolutionary”
* Professor of Sociology and Legal Studies, University of California, Santa Cruz:
hfukurai@ucsc.edu.
1. See generally, JAMES WILLIAM COLEMAN, THE CRIMINAL ELITE: UNDERSTANDING
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 11 (2005). According to Coleman, white-collar crimes include: (1)
occupation crime and (2) organizational crime. The latter can be sub-divided into: (1) corporate
crime, (2) state-corporate crime, and (3) state crime.
395
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use of the all-citizen PRC in the prosecution of state crime, one of the most
egregious of white-collar crimes committed by the government. Specifically
explored is the PRC’s role in challenging an “unequitable” bilateral treaty
between the U.S. and Japanese governments and in extending Japanese
jurisdiction over the adjudication of foreign military felons who victimize
local residents.

I. Introduction
The University of California Hastings Law School’s symposium
commemorated the 10th year anniversary of Japan’s introduction of the lay
judge system called Saiban’in Seido (a quasi-Jury system) and the
implementation of the new law governing the Prosecution Review
Commission (PRC), another lay judge system which was originally
introduced in 1948. The new system of victim participation was also
instituted in 2008, enabling crime victims to participate in criminal
proceedings, thereby radically transforming Japan’s criminal justice system
and criminal procedures. Under the leadership of U.C. Hastings Law
Professor Setsuo Miyazawa, five prominent scholars specialized in the field
of law and society in Japan offered engaging discussions on the newlyadopted Japanese legal systems that have allowed the active participation of
ordinary citizens and crime victims in Japan’s criminal justice process. Their
presentations were followed by two legal commentators, whose discussions
extended into the realm of possible public participation in the prosecution of
serious and violent white-collar crimes, namely corporate crime, statecorporate crime, and state crime, in which the government and its agencies
collaborate with large businesses and corporations in producing socially
injurious consequences.2
Prior to the symposium, Professor Setsuo Miyazawa asked all
participants, including commentators, to pay close attention to, and make
comments on, the then on-going trial of three Tokyo Electric Power
Company (TEPCO) CEOs who had been forcefully indicted in 2016 by the
Prosecution Review Commission (PRC) in Tokyo, Japan. In issuing the
2. Coleman, supra note 1. See also, Raymond J. Michalowski & Ronald C. Kramer, StateCorporate Crime and Criminological Inquiry, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF WHITE-COLLAR
AND CORPORATE CRIME (Henry N. Pontell & Gilbert Geis eds.), 200-220 (2007).
The corporate crime refers to crimes by a private corporation or its trusted personnel for their own
financial gain or on behalf of the corporation. The state-corporate crime refers to criminal acts that
occur when the institution of political governance pursues a goal in collaboration with private and
commercial institutions. The state-corporate crime often produces serious social harms that result
from the close interaction and collaboration of political and economic organizations. The statecorporate crime also results from inherently distorted relations of the government and policies and
commercial practices of corporations.
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“forced prosecution” (“kyosei kiso”) decision to TEPCO corporate
executives, the PRC reasoned that the hydrogen explosion of TEPCO’s
Fukushima No.1 Nuclear Power Plant and resultant nuclear contamination
in 2011 had led to forty-four deaths and many injuries.3 Thanks to the
implementation of the crime victim participation program in December
2008, Fukushima disaster victims were allowed to testify in the TEPCO trial.
On September 19, 2019, one day prior to the date of the Hastings symposium,
the collegial panel of three professional judges decided to acquit all three
TEPCO corporate executives on charges of professional negligence relating
to their role in the 2011 nuclear disaster at the Fukushima nuclear power
plant.
University of Hawaii Professor David T. Johnson opened the symposium
with a plenary presentation entitled, “The Limits of Change in Japanese
Criminal Justice.” Professor Johnson’s presentation provided critical
comments on Japan’s new public and victim participation programs,
identifying many limitations, including the inability of the Saiban’in trial to
adjudicate serious sex offenses and such white-collar crimes as those
allegedly committed by TEPCO executives. Professor Johnson also
critiqued the ineffectiveness of the PRC’s newly adopted indictment
decision, as only a handful of PRC-forced prosecution cases have resulted in
actual conviction. His talk was followed by Hakuoh University Professor
Mari Hirayama’s presentation, “10 Years of the Lay Judge System; Now, Do
We Have ‘Hope’ for Criminal Trials? Public and Victim Participation in the
Criminal Justice System in Japan.” Professor Hirayama critiqued Japanese
prosecutions and their incessant “obsession” with trying to obtain
confessions from suspects in nearly all criminal cases. She argued that such
an overzealous prosecutorial culture has led to the 99.9% conviction rate of
all criminally indicted cases in Japan. University of British Columbia
Professor Shigenori Matsui examined the 2008 victim participation system
and its impact on criminal justice proceedings in his presentation, “Victim
Participation in the Criminal Process in Japan.” Professor Matsui noted that
crime victims and their families had long been placed outside of the Japanese
criminal justice system and that the recent reform drastically improved the
participatory status of the crime victims and their proxies during criminal
justice proceedings. Professor Matsui also argued that the active
participation of crime victims and their proxies in the criminal trial has begun
to make criminal defense lawyering particularly difficult in recent years.
The presentation by Japanese attorney Megumi Wada explored “What
the Saiban’in System Brought to the Japan’s Criminal Justice System: From
3. Ben Dooley, Eimi Yamamitsu, and Makiko Inoue, Fukushima Nuclear Disaster Trial
Ends with Acquittals of 3 Executives, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2019.
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a Defense Attorney’s View.” She examined the efficacy of recent criminal
justice reforms and identified the ongoing problems of the criminal justice
system in Japan, including: (1) lengthy detention of criminal suspects prior
to indictment; (2) prosecutors’ overzealous tendency to extract
confessionary statements from criminal suspects under extreme mental and
physical duress; and (3) extremely high conviction rates of criminal
defendants in Japan, even after the introduction of the lay judge system.
Lastly, Georgetown Professor Carl F. Goodman examined the history of the
PRC, offering important suggestions to improve its function by allowing the
participation of legal specialists in its deliberative process. Wilfrid Laurier
University Law Professor Nikolai Kovalev followed the five presenters,
providing critical comments on Japan’s newly introduced lay and crime
victim participation systems by comparing them to the lay participation
systems of European countries. Professor Kovalev also provided valuable
insights by comparing Japan’s systems to those of post-Soviet republics,
including Russia and Kazakhstan, who had also introduced the jury trial, in
1993 and 2007 respectively.4
Using the recent PRC-indicted TEPCO trial as one of the case studies,
my comments on the presentations are structured as follows: The first section
examines the socio-legal ramifications of the new PRC law implemented in
2009, including: (1) the effectiveness of PRC’s power to force the
prosecution of white-collar crime, i.e., criminal offenses committed by
“entrusted” officials and high-ranking personnel in corporate and public
sectors; and (2) the efficacy of the continued reliance on Japanese
professional judges to prosecute white-collar criminals who had been
forcefully-indicted by the PRC. This paper uses the definition given by
former American Sociological Association (ASA) President Edwin H.
Sutherland, who coined the neologism “white-collar crime” in his 1939 ASA
presidential speech, defining it as “an illegal act, punishable by law,
committed by an individual or organization in the course of a legitimate
occupation wherein a public … trust is violated.”5 He also noted that a whitecollar criminal is likely “a person of [public] respectability and high social
status in the course of occupation.”6
Past research has shown that Japanese public prosecutors and
professional judges have been reluctant to prosecute white-collar criminals,
including powerful politicians, corporate oligarchs, and governmental
4. Nikokai Kovalev & Gulnar Suleymenova, New Kazakhstani Quasi-Jury System:
Challenges, Trends and Reforms, 38 INT’L J. OF LAW, CRIME, & JUSTICE 261 (2010).
5. EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION 7 (1983);
GLENN D. WALTERS, CRIMINAL BELIEF SYSTEMS: AN INTEGRATED INTERACTIVE THEORY OF
LIFESTYLES 129 (2002).
6. Sutherland, id. at 7.
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elites.7 The special governmental provision of “Shobun Seikun (処分請訓),”
which requires the public prosecutors to obtain a special instruction from
government executives on the prosecution of prominent political and
economic elites, has led to the dismissal of cases against many powerful
political and economic elites.8 This special “secretive” directive was
originally issued by the head of the Agency of Justice (a precursor to the
Ministry of Justice) in 1948.9 One key, yet implicit, objective of the new
2009 PRC law was to overcome the inability of the Japanese professional
prosecutors to prosecute alleged criminal offenses committed by whitecollar criminals who had long been protected and shielded from prosecution
by top government personnel in the Ministry of Justice.10 This paper argues
that the culture of invulnerability shared among corporate executives and
government officials, for example, has allowed them to commit major whitecollar crimes with impunity, including TEPCO’s corporate and professional
negligence which led to many deaths and injuries.
The second section explores the possibilities of lay judge adjudication of
PRC-indicted cases, calling for the necessity to amend the law of the existing
criminal justice systems in order to make possible the lay prosecution of
white-collar crime. Specifically, the paper explores: (1) a PRC law to
recommend that the PRC-indicted criminal case be adjudicated by a newlyintroduced Saiban’in panel, i.e., three professional judges, as well as six lay
judges selected from the community where the alleged crime occurred; (2)
the possible resurrection of Japan’s suspended Jury Law, so that an
American-style, all-citizen, 12-member jury would participate in the
adjudication of PRC-indicted cases; and lastly (3) the possibility of
amending Saiban’in Seido and Jury Law to extend their jurisdictions over
white-collar crime. TEPCO executives were forcefully indicted by the PRC
for the violation of Penal Code, Article 211, i.e., “Causing Death or Injury
7. Hiroshi Fukurai, Japan’s Prosecutorial Review Commissions: Lay Oversight of the
Government's Discretion of Prosecution, 6 U. PA. EAST ASIA L. REV., 1 (2011). For Japanese
prosecutors’ reluctant to prosecute U.S. military personnel who victimized local residents in Japan,
see Hiroshi Fukurai, Okinawa’s Citizen Judge Panels vs. U.S. Military Hegemony: Wikileaks’
Secret U.S. Cable Document on the Lay Adjudication of American Soldier Criminal Cases in
Japan’s Saiban’in Trials, 4 INT’L J. OF OKINAWAN STUDIES, 2 (2014).
8. See KAREN VAN WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWERS 221-4 (1990); DAVID
T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING CRIME IN JAPAN 131 (2001).
9. Secret Directive No.36, Agency of Justice, Prosecutors’ Office, 1948 (昭和⼆⼗三年法務
庁検務局秘第三六号訓令). Detailed discussions on the origin of this secret, special directive by

the Justice Agency in 1948 were discussed at the 176th Diet Budget Committee Session, Jan. 18,
2011, available at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/176/0014/17611180014006a.html.
10. Hiroshi Fukurai & Zhuoyu Wang, People’s Grand Jury Panels and the State’s
Inquisitorial Institutions: Prosecution Review Commissions in Japan and People’s Supervisors in
China, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J., 929 (2014).
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through Negligence in the Pursuit of Social Activities.”11 The current
Saiban’in law and Japan’s suspended Jury Law have not extended
jurisdiction over criminal cases involving corporate and professional
negligence. This section thus explores the possibility of extending the lay
judge jurisdiction to white-collar crime committed by high-ranking
corporate and government personnel.
The third section examines the political utility of PRC’s forced
indictment decision in the prosecution of another special kind of white-collar
crime, i.e., “state crime” which specifically involves the extra-territorial
protection from local prosecution of foreign nationals who have committed
crimes against local populations. Given the PRC’s unique power to instigate
the forced prosecution of the unindicted criminal, the last section looks at the
Okinawa PRC’s decision to indict and prosecute a U.S. base employee for
the death of an Okinawan youth, despite the fact the U.S. base personnel
were shielded from prosecution under the bilateral treaty called the U.S.Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).12 Similar to the case of whitecollar criminals, the protection of U.S. military personnel from local
prosecution has historically created a culture of impunity in Okinawa and
other regions with U.S. military bases, leading to the continuous
victimization of local populations, especially women, at the hands of U.S.
military-related personnel. The PRC-prosecution decision eventually forced
both the U.S. and Japanese governments to create a special SOFA provision
to allow the prosecution of U.S. military employees in Japanese courts.

II. PRC’s Effectiveness in Prosecuting White-Collar Crime
One day prior to the date of symposium, three Tokyo Electric Power
Company (TEPCO) CEOs were acquitted by the collegial panel of three
professional judges on the charges of criminal negligence resulting in deaths
and injuries relating to the 2011 explosion and nuclear disaster at the
Fukushima No.1 Nuclear Electric Power Plant.13 The Fukushima nuclear
power plant had been owned and operated by TEPCO since 1971. While the
Japanese public had demanded the prosecution of TEPCO personnel,
including top corporate executives, Japanese prosecutors had repeatedly

11. Penal Code 211. English translation available at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.
go.jp/law/detail/?id=1960.
12. Hiroshi Fukurai, A Step in the Right Direction for Japan’s Judicial Reform: Impact of the
Justice System Reform Council Recommendations on Criminal Justice and Citizen Participation in
Criminal, Civil, and Administrative Litigation, 36 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV., 517 (2013).
13. Mari Yamaguchi, TEPCO Executives Found Not Guilty of Negligence in 2011 Fukushima
Meltdown, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 19, 2019.
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decided not to prosecute them.14 The civic complaint filed with the PRC led
to the review of the prosecutors’ non-indictment decision. Three TEPCO
CEOs were finally indicted for prosecution when the Tokyo PRC decided to
reverse the public prosecutors’ non-indictment for the second time in 2015.15
The court quickly moved to appoint special prosecutors from the ranks of
attorneys in order to prosecute the CEOs, setting the date for the trial to start
in July 2017. For nearly two years, since the beginning of the trial, the three
judge panel had heard testimony on the causes of the explosions at the
Fukushima nuclear power plant, TEPCO’s failure to properly plan for the
possibility of nuclear accident, as well as the effect of nuclear contamination
of a large proportion of Northern Japan, including the southern region of
Miyagi Prefecture and eastern and central regions of Fukushima Prefecture,
among other adjacent regions.16 The Japanese judges had also listened to the
aggrieved voices of disaster victims who were subjected to governmentforced evacuation from their hospitals, homes, businesses, and farming and
fishing communities.17
A. The Effectiveness of PRC’s Power to Indict White-Collar
Criminals
Professor Johnson’s presentation covered Japan’s lay participation
systems, including the Saiban’in Seido, Prosecution Review Commissions
(PRCs), the victim participation system, penal institution visiting
committees, psychiatrists, social workers, scientists, including forensic
experts, volunteer probation officers, and citizen volunteers in crime
prevention.18 His presentation also examined the efficacy of the PRC and its
power to issue the forced indictment decision after the implementation of the
new PRC law in 2009.19 Professor Johnson stated that the PRC had
14. Osamu Tsukimori, Prosecutors Won’t Indict Former TEPCO Execs Over Fukushima,
REUTERS, Jan. 22, 2015.
15. Jonathan Soble, 3 Former Executives to be Prosecuted in Fukushima Nuclear Disaster,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2015.
16. Justin McCurry, Fukushima Nuclear Disaster: Former TEPCO Executives Go on Trial,
GUARDIAN, June 30, 2017. For serious contamination of Fukushima and Miyagi Prefectures, see
Teppei J. Yasunari, Andreas Stohl, Ryugo S. Hayano, John F. Burkhart, Sabine Eckhardt, &
Tetsuzon Yasunari, Cesium-137 Deposition and Contamination of Japanese Soils Due to the
Fukushima Nuclear Accident, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United
States of America (PNAS), Dec. 6, 2011, available at https://www.pnas.org/content/108/49/19530.
17. Tsukimori, supra note 14.
18. David T. Johnson & Dimitri Vanoverbeke, The Limit of Change in Japanese Criminal
Justice, on file with the author (a PPT file shared by Professor David T. Johnson with the presenters
at U.C. Hastings College of the Law on September 20th, 2019).
19. See also, David T. Johnson and Mari Hirayama, Japan’s Reformed Prosecution Review
Commission: Changes, Challenges, and Lessons, 14 ASIAN JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 77 (2019).
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challenged and successfully overturned prosecutors’ non-indictment
decisions in nine cases. He also indicated that one possible weakness of the
PRC was the ineffectiveness of its indictment recommendation,20 for only
two out of thirteen defendants in nine PRC forced-indicted cases were
convicted, i.e., a 15% conviction rate. Considering the fact that nearly all
criminal cases indicted by Japanese professional prosecutors have resulted
in conviction (i.e., 99.9%), the 15% conviction rate of PRC-indicted criminal
cases seemed extremely low. Professor Johnson also examined two other
highly publicized PRC reviews and their deliberations: (1) the PRC decision
that “non-indictment was improper” in the Moritomo Gakuen scandal in
Osaka; and (2) the PRC decision that “non-indictment was proper” in the
rape allegation against Noriyuki Yamaguchi, one of the closest Japanese
journalists and “personalized friends” of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
Yamaguchi had been accused of rape by a prominent female journalist,
Shiori Itoh.
The Morimoto Gakuen case involved the sweetheart land deal, in which
government-owned land was sold in 2016, significantly under market value,
to an Osaka-based school operator who has been closely linked to Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe’s wife. After public prosecutors made a decision not
to indict government bureaucrats involved in the land deal, the Osaka PRC,
which received a civic complaint regarding the prosecutors’ non-prosecution
decision, returned the “non-indictment was improper” decision on ten of 36
government bureaucrats on March 29, 2019.21 The public prosecutors
reinvestigated the case and issued yet another non-indictment decision on
August 9, 2019.22 Since the PRC failed to issue a legally binding “indictment
was proper” decision, the public prosecutors’ second non-indictment
decision officially terminated the effort to prosecute the government
bureaucrats suspected of having made an illegal land deal with the school.
Another PRC case involved renowned journalist Shiori Itoh and
Noriyuki Yamaguchi, a Washington bureau chief for the Tokyo
Broadcasting System, who had invited her to dinner to discuss a possible job
opportunity in 2015, and was accused by Itoh of raping her when she was
intoxicated and had lost consciousness.23 Yamaguchi has been said to have
close ties to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and other key members of his

20. Id.
21. Chinami Tajika & Takuji Hosomi, Morimoto Mondai: Sagawashi ra 10-nin Futatabi
Fukiso: Tokusobu Sosa-Shuketsu [Morimoto Problem: Non-indictment Against Mr. Sagawa and
10 Others: Special Investigation Concluded], ASAHI SHIMBUN, Aug. 9, 2019.
22. Id.
23. Shiori Ito: Japanese Journalist Awarded $30,000 in Damages in Rape Case, BBC NEWS,
Dec. 18, 2019, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-50832524.
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administration.24 The public prosecutors decided not to indict Yamaguchi in
2015 because of insufficient evidence. After the public complaint was filed,
the Tokyo PRC deliberated on the case and ruled that no indictment was
called for.25 The group called “Open the Black Box” was created in April
2019 by supporters of Itoh, to bring much-needed transparency into the
secretive and “closed” nature of the investigation of rape and other sex
crimes, because no detailed accounts of the investigations were shared with
crime victims.26 Professor Johnson made the critical observation that there
are two specific types of criminal cases that the newly-implemented
Saiban’in trial has failed to adjudicate, despite their important societal
ramifications: (1) serious sex offenses; and (2) white-collar crime and
corporate crime.27
As Professor Johnson noted in his presentation on the nine PRC-forced
prosecution cases, it is important to realize that five of these cases (56 %)
and nine of thirteen defendants (69%) involved the allegation of white-collar
crime committed by highly privileged governmental, political, and economic
elites. Specifically, these cases involved: (1) professional negligence by the
Deputy Chief of the Akashi Police Department in the Akashi Pedestrian
Bridge incident; (2) professional negligence by three railway company
presidents in the JR West Amagasaki Rail Crash case; (3) insider trading by
a company president in the Okinawa Unlisted Stock Fraud case; (4) political
funding violations by Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) leader Ichiro Ozawa
in the Rikuzankai case; and (5) corporate and professional negligence by
three top corporate executives in the TEPCO Nuclear Disaster case.28 All of
these crimes are alleged to have been committed by white-collar criminals.
The devastating societal and human consequences of white-collar crime
are well-known, including harmful impacts on human health, damage to a
community’s moral climate, serious financial costs and economic losses,
human rights violations, as well as the destruction of nature, the environment
and ecosystems.29 Critical studies of white-collar crime have led to multiple
classifications of a number of immoral corporate practices, unethical
24. See generally, SHANNA VAN SLYKE, MICHAEL L. BENSON, & FRANCIS T. CULLEN, THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME (2016) [hereinafter Oxford Handbook].
25. Azusa Mishima, Journalist Shiori Ito Gets Help With Fight For Damages Over Alleged
Rape, ASAHI SHIMBUN, Apr. 12, 2019.
26. Open the Black Box, Itoh Shiori-san no Minji Saiban o Sasaeru-Kai [Group to Support
Shiori Itoh’s Civil Trial], last accessed on Jan. 1, 2020, available at https://www.opentheblack
box.jp/?lang=en.
27. Johnson, supra note at 16 (slide # 10, on file with the author).
28. For the case background information of PRC-forced criminal cases, see Johnson &
Hirayama (2019).
29. See generally, R. F. Meier & J. F. Short, Consequences of White-Collar Crime, in WHITE
COLLAR CRIME: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY VIEWS (G. Geis, R. F. Meier & L. M. Salinger
eds.), 80-104 (1985).
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government policies and programs, as well as egregious state-corporate
collaborative activities.30 Today white-collar crime is seen to include: (1)
corporate crime consisting of illegal actions committed by corporations,
business entities, and/or personnel who represent privately owned
collectivist entities; (2) state crime committed by states and governments in
order to “further a variety of domestic and foreign policies [and
objectives]”;31 and (3) state-corporate crime resulting from the close
collaboration between the policies of the state, on one hand, and the policies
and practices of privately owned enterprises to maximize profit, on the
other.32 Past studies have also shown that human costs and economic and
financial losses resulting from white-collar crime have far exceeded those
resulting from street crime, including more injuries and deaths due to
dangerous working environments, long-term diseases associated with
employment in certain industries, environmental pollution, and dangerous
consumer goods, among many others. In the U.S., for instance, the FBI
estimates that the annual cost of white-collar crime is nearly one trillion
dollars, compared with $15 billion for street crime.33
The dangerous impact of Japan’s white-collar crime on the general
population, the environment, the nature, and ecosystems follow this pattern.
Among the nine PRC-indicted cases, three of five white-collar crimes had
resulted in multiple deaths and injuries, including: (1) the Akashi Pedestrian
Bridge stampede incident in 2001, that led to 247 injuries and 11 deaths,
including nine children, ranging in age from five months to nine years, who
had been crushed to death at the pedestrian bridge;34 (2) the JR West
Fukuchiyama derailment accident in 2005, in which 107 passengers were
killed and 562 were injured;35 and (3) the 2011 nuclear accident and
explosion at TEPCO’s nuclear power plant in Fukushima, leading to the

30.
31.

Oxford Handbook, supra note 24.
See EUGENE MCLAUGHLIN AND JOHN MUNCIE, THE SAGE DICTIONARY OF
CRIMINOLOGY 417 (2006). State crime includes: (1) criminal offenses committed by security and
police forces, such as genocide, torture, imprisonment without trial, and forced disappearance of
political dissenters; (2) political crimes committed by the government, such as corruption, illegal
surveillance, and censorship; (3) economic crimes violating health and safety laws; and (4) sociocultural crimes, including institutional racism and cultural vandalism.
32. See generally, Raymond J. Michalowski & Ronald C. Kramer, State-Corporate Crime
and Criminological Inquiry, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF WHITE-COLLAR AND CORPORATE
CRIME ( Henry N. Pontell & Gilbert Geis eds.), 200-220 (2007).
33. Scott A. Bonn, Why Elite White-Collar Criminals are Rarely Punished, PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY, Apr. 9, 2017, available at https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/wicked-deeds/201
704/why-elite-white-collar-criminals-are-rarely-punished.
34. See generally, Hiroshi Fukurai, Japan’s Prosecutorial Review Commissions: Lay
Oversight of the Government’s Discretion of Prosecution, 6 EAST ASIAN LAW REVIEW 1 (2011).
35. Id.
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death of 44 patients and injuries of 13.36 The radiation fallout also
contaminated many areas and regions beyond the confine of the Fukushima
Prefecture, forcing hundreds of thousands of residents to flee from their
residence and communities.37 All three cases involved defendants who were
high-ranking: a Deputy Chief of Police in the Akashi Police Department,
three former JR West presidents, and an ex-Chairman and two former vice
presidents of TEPCO.
In the case of the Akashi Stampede incident, the Akashi Police
Department, its city government, and a security firm had been forewarned of
the risk of another likely stampede in 2001, because in December 2000,
during a millennium fireworks celebration, nearly 3,000 people had surged
onto the same bridge, creating a similarly chaotic scene.38 In the
Fukuchiyama derailment incident, the investigation revealed the egregious
practice of corporate punishment and penalties assessed against train drivers
for their failure to operate their train punctually.39 The train driver who
caused the derailment incident was trying to make up for lost time by
speeding the train up to 120-km per hour, far exceeding the safety speed
limit.40 Furthermore, the investigation revealed that JR West had decided
not to install the Automatic Train Stop (ATP) system to warn and stop the
high-speeding train because of cost-cutting measures.41 The investigative
report concluded that “there was a corporate culture that prioritized
protection of the company’s [financial] interests over those of the accident
victims as well as the public sentiments.”42
In examining the causes of the nuclear disaster in Fukushima, the
Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission
(FNAIIC) concluded that the Fukushima nuclear disasters, including reactor
meltdown, were man-made disasters caused by poor regulation and collusion
among the government, the TEPCO operator, and the industry’s watchdog
agency.43 The FNAIIC report also indicated that the magnitude-9 earthquake
which preceded the tidal wave that hit the Fukushima No.1 Nuclear Power
36. Magdalena Osumi, Former TEPCO Executives Found Not Guilty of Criminal Negligence
in Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 19, 2019.
37. See generally, JEFFREY KINGSTON, TSUNAMI: JAPAN’S POST-FUKUSHIMA FUTURE
(2011).
38. Kazuhiko, Nagase, Fukuchiyama-sen Dassenjiko no Mondai o Kataru [Discussing the
Problems of the Fukuchiyama Line Derailment], 39 TETSUDO JANARU [RAILWAY JOURNAL] 6873 (2005).
39. Yoko Inoue & Ken Iguchi, Report Slams JR West’s Corporate Culture, DAILY YOMIURI,
Nov. 30, 2009, at 3.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Justin McCurry, Fukushima Reactor Meltdown Was a Man-Made Disaster, Says Official
Report, GUARDIAN, July 5, 2012.
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Plant could not be ruled out as a cause of the accident. Further, FNAIIC Chair
Kiyoshi Kurokawa concluded that the Fukushima disaster was “a disaster
‘Made in Japan.’ Its fundamental causes are to be found in the ingrained
conventions of … our reflexive obedience; our reluctance to question [the]
authority; our devotion to ‘sticking with the programme’; our groupism; and
our insularity.”44 In each of these three catastrophes, Japanese public
prosecutors repeatedly refused to issue the indictment against a government
bureaucrat and corporate executives. Only civic complaints from victims
and their proxies, which were submitted to the prefectural PRCs, led to the
eventual indictment and trial of the high-ranking professional elites.45
In addition to the above three instances, the PRC also examined another
white-collar crime that led to multiple deaths and injuries. In December
2012, a tunnel ceiling collapsed and crushed three vehicles in the Sasago
Chuo Expressway Tunnel in Yamanashi Prefecture, leading to the deaths of
nine people and injuries of three passengers. The prosecutors examined the
causes of the incident, and after the investigation, announced the decision
not to prosecute ten people accused of professional negligence, including the
former president of Central Nippon Expressway Company (NEXCOCentral), which was the operator of the Sasago Chuo Expressway Tunnel,
and maintenance supervisors at NEXCO-Central and its subsidiary.46 In
August, 2018, victims’ families and a group of scientists who had also
examined the causes of incident decided to file a petition to the local PRC to
challenge the propriety of the prosecutors’ non-indictment decision.47 One
year later, in August 2019, the PRC announced that the prosecutors’ original
non-indictment decision regarding two inspectors of both NEXCO-Central
and its subsidiary was not proper, forcing the public prosecutors to
reinvestigate the case. The PRC decision was not “indictment was proper,”
and thus did not carry the legally binding mandate for the prosecutors to
reverse their initial non-prosecution decision.48 Nonetheless, their “nonindictment was improper” decision forced the prosecutors to reconsider their
original non-indictment decision. As of today, the local prosecutors have yet
to make any announcement regarding whether or not they will reverse their
initial non-indictment decision or will re-issue the non-prosecution decision.
In order to respond to the aggrieved voices of crime victims and their

44. Id.
45. The trial of the deputy chief of police did not occur because the statute of limitation had
expired.
46. No Indictments over 2012 Fatal Tunnel Collapse in Japan, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 24, 2018.
47. Id.
48. Sasago Jiko, Fukisofuto no Gigetsu [At Sasago Tunnel Accident, PRC Resolution of “NonIndictment” as Improper], ASAHI NEWSPAPER, Aug. 2, 2019.
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families in Japan,49 the PRC has seemed to function as a civic oversight to
question and challenge the culture of impunity shared among corporate
executives and government elites, knowing that they would not be
prosecuted for professional negligence regardless of the human
consequences of their organizational decisions and business practices.
Similarly, the PRC’s examination of the propriety of non-indictment
decision on white-collar crime also seems to have questioned the culture of
public prosecutors’ blind subservience to the special instruction from top
governmental bureaucrats in relation to the prosecution of professional
elites. Further, the PRC’s legally binding power to initiate the forced
prosecution of white-collar crime has challenged the corporate and
governmental policies that have continued to prioritize their interests over
the rights and safety of people, communities, and society at large.
B. The Possibility of the Lay Adjudication of PRC-Indicted
Criminal Cases
There are other perspectives that need to be incorporated into the
interpretation of the “failure” of the PRC’s forced indictments to result in the
conviction of white-collar defendants. This failure may not be due to the
structural problem or policy defect inherent in the lay institution of PRC
itself, but to the existing structure of government policies and prosecutorial
practices. As stated earlier, the institutional directive called “shobun seikun”
in the Ministry of Justice tends to prioritize the rights of government interests
and the rights of well-connected political and economic elites over the rights
and the interests of people, crime victims, and general communities. The
PRC became the prime lay institution to respond to civic grievances and has
been responsible for the reversal of prosecutors’ non-indictment decisions
regarding white-collar crime. Without the PRC-forced prosecution, the trial
of white-collar criminals would never have taken place.
Another reason that the PRC-indicted cases did not result in the
conviction of white-collar defendants is that the key decision-makers in these
PRC-forced trials have been the Japanese professional judges. These trials
of white-collar criminals were conducted without involvement of lay judges
drawn from the community where alleged crimes occurred. Past research
has indicated that Japanese professional judges have repeatedly shown their
refusal to convict powerful elites and professionals, including government
officials, corporate elites, prominent politicians, and high-ranking criminal

49. See generally, KEN SHIROISHI, KIGYOHANZAI, FUSHOJI NO JOSEISAKU [CORPORATE
CRIME AND SCANDALS: LEGAL STRATEGIES] (2007).

5 - Fukurai

408

7/29/2020 10:12 AM

Hastings Journal of Crime and Punishment

[Vol. 1:3

justice personnel.50 Given this history, the court’s acquittal of all whitecrime defendants in PRC-indicted trials, including three TEPCO CEOs, was
not surprising. Some critical observers of the Japanese court had long
predicted the acquittal of TEPCO corporate executives before the court’s
acquittal announcement in September 2019.51
The dedicated subservience of Japanese professional judges to the
interests of renowned politicians, powerful government elites, and corporate
executives has long been well-known. Even in their rulings in politically
controversial cases, such as the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Force
despite public questions and criticisms, the construction of U.S. military
bases against strong oppositions by nearby residents, and the operation of
nuclear power plants throughout Japan, and even after the 2011 nuclear
disaster in Fukushima, the Japanese judges have continued to rule in favor
of the government’s policies and programs, despite public outcry, mass
demonstrations, civil disobedience, street marches, and petition campaigns.52
Past research has shown that many Japanese judges have sided with powerful
politicians and the dominant political party in rendering decisions supporting
their views and interpretations of the constitution, political perspectives, and
governmental policies and programs. Those judges who failed to conform
to the dominant political current and ideologies were often punished, if not
pushed out of the judiciary all together. In examining the behaviors of
Japan’s judges, Ramseyer and Rasmusen concluded that “judicial
independence in Japan has real limits. In politically sensitive cases, judges
seem to indulge their political preferences at their peril.”53 Given the
professional judges’ refusal to advance the interests and rights of people,
communities and the environment over the interests of the government and
corporate sectors, the following section explores the possible public
prosecution of PRC-indicted cases beyond the bench trial system, including
a newly-adopted Saiban’in system, as well as an American-style, 12-member
jury trial, which Japan had operated for the fifteen years from 1928 to 1943.

50. See generally, Takashi Maruta, BAISHIN SAIBAN O KANGAERU: HOTEINI MIRU NICHIBEI
BUNKA HIKAKU [THE CONSIDERATION OF JURY SYSTEM: JAPAN-U.S. CROSS-NATIONAL
ANALYSIS IN THE COURTROOM] (1990). See also, J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why
Are Japanese Judges so Conservative in Politically Charged Cases? (1999), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/268.pdf.
51. Colin P.A. Jones, The TEPCO Verdict is Predictable But Not Insignificant, JAPAN TIMES,
Sept. 19, 2019. See also, Richard Wilcox, Democracy in Japan: Derailed by the Nuclear Mafia,
DiaNuke.Org, Sept. 14, 2012 (with respect to similar liability cases of radiation sickness cases in
the past, stating that “Unsurprisingly, the Japanese justice system … plays an integral role in siding
with the Nuclear Mafia”).
52. Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 50.
53. Id.
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C. The PRC Amendment to Adjudicate PRC-Indicted Cases in Lay
Judge Trials
The PRC is a unique lay institution in Japan’s criminal justice system, in
which the members are solely composed of citizens randomly selected from
the local community. The reason that the institution has been often called an
American-style, “civil grand jury” is that its mission is to examine and
inspect local public offices, including the prosecutor’s office, the police
department, local jails, and other public offices to ensure that they function
legally and properly.54 For example, California’s state law requires that all
58 counties must impanel a civil grand jury for each fiscal year in order to
scrutinize the conduct of public business by city and county governments
and issue a report with findings and recommendations, followed by
presentations to the Board of Supervisors and the media.55 Any civic
complaint of possible white-collar crime committed by public officials
triggers an investigation by the civil grand jury, as Section 925 of the
California Penal Code specifically indicates that the civil grand jury shall
investigate “operations, accounts and registers of the officers, departments,
or functions of the county,”56 prison conditions and management, any willful
or corrupt conduct on the part of public officers within the county, as well as
report on the offices, accounts and records of the officials or entities of the
county, including any special or legislative district.57
The civic oversight function of government officials has been carried out
by the grand jury in other U.S. states as well. For example, in November
2008, the Texas grand jury indicted then-U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney
for a conflict of interest pertaining to his private investment in a corporation
that runs federal prisons.58 The conflict of interest stemmed from Cheney’s
political influence over federal contracts awarded to private corporations in
the construction and institutional management of federal prisons. The South
Texas grand jury also indicted then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez for
obstruction of justice, as America’s top prosecutor under the Bush
Administration tried to stop the investigation of Cheney’s collusion with
prison industries.59 Texas State Senator Eddie Lucio, Jr. was also indicted,

54. See generally, Hiroshi Fukurai, Proposal to Establish the System of the Federal Civil
Grand Jury in America: Effective Civil Oversight of Federal Agencies and Government Personnel,
3 J. CIVIL LEGAL SCI. 112 (2014).
55. Id.
56. CA Penal Code Section 925.
57. Fukurai, supra note 54.
58. Grand Jury Indicts US Vice President, NORTHERN TERRITORY NEWS (Australia), Nov.
20, 2008, at 13.
59. Id.
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as he allegedly accepted bribes from private prison firms.60 This was a great
victory for the office of county prosecutors who investigated the case and
brought indictments against prominent U.S. politicians. Nonetheless, in
December, a politically motivated county judge made an unprecedented
decision to dismiss the indictments.61 While these venues of indictment
occurred in different national jurisdictions, this offers another instance in
which a professional judge tried to shield powerful political elites from the
prosecution of white-collar crime. The grand jury indictments in Texas also
demonstrated that there would not be absolute political immunity for
powerful politicians when an equitable judgment on indictment was made
by a select group of fair-minded citizens based on prosecutorial evidence
concerning the allegation of white-collar crime.
What happens to white-collar crime if alleged perpetrators are indicted
and tried in court? In the U.S., white-collar criminals have the option of
choosing a bench trial or a jury trial. Research has shown that such
defendants have tended to opt for a jury trial, because the jury was more
likely to place blame on corporations and business entities than on individual
executives.62 White-collar defendants tried to convince the jury that their
personal role was trivial and not worthy of blame, by distancing themselves
from corporate and institutional culpability.63 Other research has shown that
white-collar defendants also preferred a jury trial because a single juror could
derail a jury from reaching a unanimous verdict, thereby resulting in a hung
jury.64 In highly specialized and technically sophisticated cases, however,
white-collar defendants tend to prefer the professional bench trial.65
1. Attorney Megumi Wada’s Presentation: From a Defense
Attorney’s Perspective
Under the current legal system, Japanese professional judges remain as
sole adjudicators of white-collar crime. As examined earlier, Japanese
professional judges and public prosecutors have been reluctant to prosecute
highly-positioned governmental officials and renowned political and
60. Id.
61. Indictment Against Cheney, Gonzales Dismissed, Associated Press State & Local Wire,
Dec. 2, 2008.
62. Valerie Hans, The Jury’s Response to Business and Corporate Wrongdoing, 52 LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 177 (1989).
63. KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT
WORK (1985); STANTON WHEELER, KENNETH MANN, & AUSTIN SARAT, SITTING IN JUDGMENT:
THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS (1988).
64. DAVID. O. FRIEDRICHS, TRUSTED CRIMINALS: WHITE COLLAR CRIME IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 328 (2010).
65. Id.
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economic elites. In the post-2009 era, the majority of PRC’s legally binding
indictments were issued against perpetrators of white-collar crime, i.e., 5 out
of 9 cases (55.5%), with the majority of suspects also white-collar criminals,
i.e., 9 out of 13 (69.2%). Furthermore, the professional judges returned
convictions in none of these cases. However, there has been an exception in
the prosecution of white-collar criminal in recent years, as Attorney Megumi
Wada elaborated in her presentation.
Attorney Wada indicated that there was a bifurcated, discriminatory
system of prosecuting white-collar criminals based on their nationality. For
instance, former Nissan President Carlos Ghosn has been detained for
months and has thus far resisted providing a “confession” of his
wrongdoing.66 Nissan is one of the six largest automakers in the world, and
in 2014, became the largest car manufacturer in North America.67 Ghosn
was arrested in November 2018 by Tokyo public prosecutors soon after his
arrival from Lebanon on his private jet, over the allegation of false
accounting, and was detained for the next 108 days on three other charges of
financial misconduct and aggravated breach of trust.68 He was granted bail
in early March and was again detained for an additional 10 days of further
investigation and interrogation.69
His harsh treatment by Japan’s
professional prosecutors represents a stark contrast to that of TEPCO CEOs
or other governmental and political elites, as none of the PRC-indicted whitecollar defendants had been detained or subjected to harsh police detention
and prosecutorial interrogation. Attorney Wada indicated that Carlos Ghosn,
who was a Brazilian-born French businessman of Lebanese ancestry, has
been subjected to lengthy detention prior to indictment, and the court has
repeatedly rejected a bail request from Ghosn, stating that he was a flight
risk.70 His investigation has been prompted by a whistleblower who insisted
that Ghosn had been misrepresenting his salary and using company assets
for personal purposes.71
Attorney Wada criticized the continued reliance by the Japanese public
prosecutors on so-called “hostage justice systems” in order to secure
detention and interrogation, so as to extract confessionary statements and
66. Edo Naito, Examining Carlos Ghosn and Japan’s System of ‘Hostage Justice, JAPAN
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2019.
67. Bertel Schmitt, Who Makes the Most Cars in North America? Who Has the Largest Auto
Factory in the U.S.? Don’t Be Embarrassed, Few Get It Right, DAILY KANBAN, Feb. 27, 2015.
68. Justin McCurry, Carlos Ghosn to Fight to ‘Bitter End’ As Ex-Nissan Chairman Detained
for 10 Days, GUARDIAN, Apr. 5, 2019.
69. Id.
70. Megumi Wada, What Saiban’in System Brought to the Japan’s Criminal Justice System,
Sept. 20, 2019 (Attorney Wada’s PowerPoint on file with the author).
71. Amy Tsang, Who is Carlos Ghosn and Why is He in Trouble?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21,
2018.

5 - Fukurai

412

7/29/2020 10:12 AM

Hastings Journal of Crime and Punishment

[Vol. 1:3

thus maintain an “extremely high conviction rate.”72 Attorney Wada added
that Japanese prosecutors have also indicted Ghosn with additional charges
of breach of trust, with his alleged misconduct expanding outside Japan.73
Given Japanese professional prosecutors’ overzealous legal maneuvers and
creative protocols employed to maximize the likelihood of his conviction, it
may be likely that Japan’s professional judges will rule against Carlos Ghosn
when his crimes are adjudicated in the professional bench trial. Given the
threat and danger of “unfair” prosecution and likely conviction, Ghosn fled
Japan on December 30th and went to Lebanon, breaking his bail condition.
He issued a public statement that he “will no longer be held hostage by a
rigged Japanese justice system where guilt is presumed, discrimination is
rampant and basic human rights are denied.”74 Ghosn added that “I have not
fled justice [but] I have escaped injustice and political persecution.”75
If the Japanese criminal law were modified to allow the lay adjudication
of white-collar crimes, including those allegedly committed by Carlos Ghosn
and TEPCO corporate executives, among others, would the trial outcome be
different from that of the bench trial? Under the current Japanese criminal
justice system, none of the white-collar crimes, including PRC-indicted
cases, are adjudicated in a lay judge trial, but rather in the professional bench
trial. If Japan’s public prosecutors and professional judges are unable to
detach themselves from powerful political influence and bureaucratic
customs and obligations, would it be reasonable to assume that the lay judge
trial may offer a viable and fair alternative to the adjudication of white-collar
crime? Will Ghosn return to Japan if he will not be held hostage “by a rigged
Japanese Justice system where guilt is presumed [by public prosecutors and
professional judges]”?
The following section explores the possibility of amending the new 2009
PRC law in order to allow the lay adjudication of white-collar crime in Japan,
including PRC-indicted cases, considering two possible venues: (1) the
Saiban’in trial that was adopted in 2009; and (2) the American-style, 12member all-citizen jury trial, which Japan once operated.

72. Id.
73. Id. See also, Ex-Nissan Chairman Carlos Ghosn Indicted on Additional Charges in
Japan, USA TODAY, Apr. 22, 2019.
74. Ghosn Confirms in Statement that He Is in Lebanon, NHK WORLD-JAPAN, Dec. 31, 2019.
75. Id.
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D. The Lay Adjudication of PRC-Indicted Cases in Saiban’in Trials
It is important to reiterate that the classification of triable offenses under
the Saiban’in law does not include white-collar crime. As a result, none of
the PRC-indicted white-collar defendants were tried in the mixed tribunal.
The Saiban’in system introduced in 2009 was originally designed to
adjudicate serious and violent crimes involving the death penalty or infinite
imprisonment with or without hard labor, as well as crimes that caused the
victim’s death by intentional criminal actions. The class of specific criminal
offenses under the Saiban’in law thus included arson, infringement,
capsizing of trains, water poisoning, currency counterfeiting and its use,
official document counterfeiting, burglary with bodily harm, indecent
assault, murder, kidnapping for ransom, criminal insurrection, and
instigation and assistance of foreign aggression.76
Research has shown that the general public has complained about and
challenged the public prosecutors’ refusal to indict and prosecute whitecollar criminals in the past. For instance, among 113,427 cases reviewed
by the PRC for the more than half century from 1949 to 2015, the majority
were crimes committed by highly privileged white-collar professionals
(51.0%). The largest proportion of non-indictment cases reviewed by the
PRC were professional negligence cases that often led to death and/or
injury in the pursuit of social and economic activities.77 Professional
negligence cases alone accounted for a total of 18,133 reviews (16.0%),
suggesting that one of every seven PRC-reviewed cases was a whitecollar crime, similar to the ones committed by TEPCO and JR West
executives. These negligent cases were followed by other white-collar
crimes, such as fraud (11.6%), document counterfeit (11.3%),78 the abuse
of authority by special public officers (8.4%), and embezzlement in the
pursuit of social activities (3.7%).79 While the counterfeiting of
documents fell within the class of crime categories adjudicated in the
Saiban’in trial, crimes of professional and corporate negligence resulting
in death and injury did not, which meant that, technically speaking, no
matter how many deaths and injuries resulted from the neglect of legal
obligations and responsibilities by powerful private enterprises and/or
governmental institutions, lay judges had no jurisdiction to examine the
causes and culprits of such socially impacted crimes. Thus far, the
76. MASAHIRO FUJITA, JAPANESE SOCIETY AND LAY PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
SOCIAL ATTITUDES, TRUST, AND MASS MEDIA 17 (2017).
77. Johnson & Hirayama, supra note 18, at 82.
78. Id. at 82, Table 1.
79. Id. These cases of white-collar crime amounted to 51.0% of all PRC reviewed cases from
1949 to 2015.
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adjudication of white-collar crime has been effectively placed outside the
reach of the lay judge system.
1. Professor Mari Hirayama and the Ten Year Anniversary of
Saiban’in Trials
Hakuoh Law Professor Mari Hirayama offered critical observations of the
Saiban’in trial and its operation for the last ten years, arguing that the
introduction of the lay judge system has helped transform Japanese criminal
justice from a dossier-centered trial to an oral argument-centered trial.80 She
also observed that the indictment rate has decreased dramatically, suggesting
that professional prosecutors have become more careful about indictment
decisions, exercising more discretion in decisions not to indict the alleged
criminal suspect.81 At the same time, the “positive” aspect of introducing the
lay judge system has also appeared, including the significant impact on Japanese
legislation that has resulted from lay judge trials in sex crime cases. The
Japanese government has long neglected to incorporate the rights of women,
including those of sexual crime victims, into the criminal justice system. Finally,
on July 13, 2017, Japanese legislation included a major provision regarding sex
crime, for the first time in 110 years of its history. The changes included: (1) the
“crime of rape” was changed into “crime of coerced intercourse”; (2) males were
included as possible victims of “coerced intercourse”; (3) “crime of coerced
intercourse” became punishable with imprisonment of no less than five years,
while three years or less were imposed on rape offenders; (4) complaint by
victims was no longer mandatory to indict sex crime cases by prosecutors; and
(5) new crime of “intercourse by custodian” and “indecent behaviors by
custodian” against children under 18 was introduced, and the evidence of
“assault or threats” was no longer required for these crimes to be established.82
Another positive aspect of introducing the lay judge system, according
to Professor Hirayama, has involved the establishment of a legal education
curriculum for school children. The Japanese government amended the
government instructional guideline (“gakushu shido yoko”) in 2008 to
include information on the lay judge systems, such as Saiban’in trials and
PRCs, and the importance of citizen participation in the justice system, in the
elementary school curriculum from 2011. The legal education curriculum
including the mock jury trial, was also introduced at junior high schools in
2012 and at high schools in 2013.83 The discussion in schools of Japan’s
80. Mari Hirayama, 10 Years of the Lay Judge System: Now, Do We Have “Hope” for
Criminal Trials? Sept. 20, 2019 (Professor Hirayama’s PowerPoint on file with the author).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. See also, Yasuhiro Hashimoto, Ho-kyoiku no Genjo to Kadai: Kan to Min no Torikumi
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popular lay judge systems may have brought about greater awareness of the
societal significance of civic participation in the administration of justice.
As many residents of Fukushima and adjacent areas have been affected by
the nuclear disaster, it may not be long before the students may begin to
engage in honest discussion on the possible adjudication of white-collar
crime in the Saiban’in trial. Further, the participation in mock trials at
schools in Fukushima may extend the discussion of possible lay adjudication
into the realm of civil disputes on the compensation and monetary restitution
to the victims of white-collar crime, such as disaster refugees and
Fukushima’s babies and children who continue to suffer from radiationrelated illnesses, including leukemia, thyroid cancers, and infant congenital
heart diseases.84
2. Professor Shigenori Matsui’s Analysis of Victim Participation in
Japan
Another important change that the lay judge system has brought is the
establishment of the rights of crime victims in Japanese criminal justice and
the creation of their support systems.85 Professor Shigenori Matsui’s
research has demonstrated the long history in Japan of disrespecting the
voices and the rights of crime victims and their families by marginalizing
their involvement in the criminal justice process.86 Today, the victims can
attend the trial and express in the courtroom their opinions on the impact of
the crimes. Some victims are now allowed to sit together with the
professional prosecutors, ask questions of witnesses and defendants, and
express their grievances and opinions before the conclusion of the trial.
Crime victims can also ask for a damage order against the defendant during

ni Chakumoku Shite [Reality of Legal Education and Issues: Focusing on Public-Private
Initiatives], last visited Dec. 25, 2019, available at https://www.npa.go.jp/english/kyuuyo1/
Police_Support_for_Crime_Victims.pdf, https://www.houterasu.or.jp/houterasu_gaiyou/kouhou/
kankoubutsu/sougouhouritsushien.files/100524747.pdf.
84. Lucy Craft, Study Links Fukushima Disaster to Spike in Infant Heart Surgeries, CBS
NEWS, Mar. 14, 2019. For the prevalence of thyroid cancers, see Akira Ohtsuru, Sanae
Midorikawa, & Tetsuya Ohira, Incidence of Thyroid Cancer Among Children and Young Adults in
Fukushima, Japan, Screened With 2 Rounds of Ultrasonography Within 5 Years of the 2011
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Accident, 145 JAMA OTOLARYNGOL HEAD NECK
SURG. 4 (2019).
85. National Police Agency Office for Crime Victims, Police Support for Crime Victims,
accessed on Dec. 25, 2019, available at https://www.npa.go.jp/english/kyuuyo1/Police_Support_
for_Crime_Victims.pdf.
86. Shigenori Matsui, Justice for the Accused or Justice for Victims? The Protection of
Victims’ Rights in Japan, 13 ASIAN-PACIFIC LAW & POLICY JOURNAL 54 (2011).
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the trial.87 In order to protect the victim’s privacy, the court can also decide
whether or not to reveal the name of victim while reading a writ of
prosecution.88 Professor Matsui also indicated that various protective
measures have been instituted to ensure the rights and privacy of victims,
including the presence of support persons, physical fences to shield victims
from the defendant and the general public, as well as the use of a video link.
If the victim does not have financial resources to hire a legal proxy, the courtappointed attorney is also made available.89
These extra measures to protect the anonymity and privacy of crime
victims in court, however, have not always been welcomed by legal
professionals. For instance, Attorney Megumi Wada criticized the newly
adopted victim participation system because it tends to provide excessive
uses of measures to protect the victims, including often “obtrusive” physical
shields used in a small courtroom, and a video device for witnesses to testify
in a remote place where the judges and attorneys were physically not
present.90 Furthermore, crime victims could be present and allowed to
express their opinions at trial despite the fact that the defendant continued to
claim innocence.91

III. The Resurrection of Japan’s Jury Law and the Lay
Adjudication of PRC-Indicted Cases
Another avenue through which PRC-indicted cases, including whitecollar crime, could be tried by lay judges would be through Japan’s jury
system. The American-style, all-citizen, 12-member criminal jury trial that
operated in Japan from 1928 to 1943 was abruptly suspended when the
Second World War began. The Japanese government said that it would bring
back the lay judge system once the war was over.92 The 1943 Jury Trial
Suspension Act (Baishin Ho no Teishi ni Kansuru Horitsu) stipulated that
“the jury system will be re-activated when the War is over.”93 However,
after the war, the Japanese government refused to honor its promise to
87. Shigenori Matsui, Victim Participation into the Criminal Process in Japan, Sept. 19, 2019
(Professor Matsui’s PowerPoint on file with the author).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Wada, supra note 70.
91. Matsui, supra note 86.
92. See generally, Takashi Maruta, The Criminal Jury System in Imperial Japan and the
Contemporary Argument for Its Reintroduction, 72 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PENAL LAW 215
(2001/1-2).
93. See also, LESTER W. KISS, REVIVING THE CRIMINAL JURY IN JAPAN, 62 LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 261 (1999). The original Suspension Act in 1943 is available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20170928154731/http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S18/S18HO088.html.
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reinstitute the criminal jury into the Japanese criminal justice system. The
General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP)
also made numerous efforts to reinstate the jury system. However, highranking Japanese bureaucrats and government personnel strongly opposed
the efforts. Their arguments and official rationales included the ideas that the
Japanese might not be mature enough to operate the jury system, and that the
Imperial jury system in Japan had been a failure.94
Regardless of these rationalizations, it is important to recognize that the
Jury Act of 1928 has never been abolished, and the system of criminal jury
trial has not been eradicated from Japanese criminal law. Japan’s jury law
has literally been “put on sleep” by the Japanese government, which is still
refusing to act, despite its own Jury Trial Suspension Act in 1943 mandated
its return following the war. Thus, one way of reinstituting a criminal jury
trial in Japan is to “awaken” the dormant Jury Law and firmly reinstitute it
in the Japanese criminal justice system.
The criminal jury trial had played a prominent socio-political role in
Japanese society until its suspension in 1943. For fifteen years, Japan held
nearly five hundred criminal jury trials (n=484). Each trial required the
selection of a 12-member jury and alternates, suggesting that more than six
thousand Japanese citizens had directly participated in the criminal jury trial.
Jury research has shown that the popular jury frequently acquitted
defendants (17%), i.e., in nearly one of every six criminal cases.95 This high
acquittal rate is remarkable because the greatest number of jury trials took
place during the era of Japanese fascism in the 1930s and early 1940s, when
imperial prosecutors held near absolute authority and power over criminal
justice prosecution. Japanese prosecutors had arrested and prosecuted
political dissidents, labor activists, left-wing academicians and scholars,
journalists, prominent socialists, communists, and anarchists, many of whom
were interrogated, tortured, and prosecuted in Japan’s autocratic criminal
justice system.96 Yet, the lay judges had still rendered an acquittal verdict in
17% of all criminal jury trials. Similarly, the conviction rate of 83% in jury
trials from 1928 to 1943 is significantly lower than the 99.9% conviction rate
of all Japanese bench trials in the post-WWII era, as well as the 97%
conviction rate of the new mixed tribunal since its introduction in 2009.97
94. Maruta, supra note 92, at 219.
95. See generally, CHIHIRO SAEKI, BAISHIN SAIBAN NO FUKKATSU [THE RESURRECTION OF
JURY TRIALS] (1997).
96. See generally, RAYMOND LAMONT-BROWN, KEMPEITAI: JAPAN’S DREADED MILITARY
POLICE (1998). See also, John Crump, Anarchist Opposition to Japanese Militarism, 1926-1937,
4 JAPAN FORUM 73 (1992).
97. Saiban’in Seido 10-Nen Jitairitsu 68%, Nen-nen Josho Seihanzai, Genbatsuka Susumu
[10 Years of Saiban’in System: Annually Increasing Summons Decline of 68%, Severer Sentencing
Patters on Sex-Related Crimes], TOKYO SHIMBUN, May 16, 2019.
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Ever since the Japanese government decided not to revive the Jury Law,
various civic groups and organizations have been exploring the reinstitution
of the jury into Japan’s criminal justice system. The public interest in the
lay judge system was especially strong in the early 1960s, when the U.S.
Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) decided to introduce
three systems of lay participation in the justice system in the Island of
Okinawa, which is Japan’s most-southern major island. In 1963 and 1964,
the USCAR introduced jury trials in criminal and civil matters,
respectively.98 The government also introduced the American-style,
criminal grand jury system.99 Any person who stayed on the island for three
months or more became eligible to serve on a jury, regardless of nationality,
national origin, race, gender, religion, creed, or any other socio-cognitive
barriers or identities.100 Since the jury trial was introduced and commenced
during the Vietnam War, many military personnel and their dependents also
served on the criminal and civil trials, along with Okinawan residents,
Japanese civil contractors, Filipino workers at U.S. military bases,
academicians, business owners, homemakers, and even trading merchants
from the Middle East, among many others.101
Chihiro Isa, one of the Okinawan jurors who served on a criminal jury
trial in 1964, developed a strong interest in the democratic role that the jury
played in Okinawa, and wrote a book on his jury experience, explaining the
criminal trial in which he served, and sharing his personal views and
evaluation of criminal court proceedings from the perspective of an
Okinawan resident. His book “Gyakuten: Amerika Shihaika, Okinawa no
Baishin Saiban [Reversal: Okinawa’s Jury Trial Under the U.S.
Occupation]” was published in 1977 and received the prestigious Oya Soichi
Non-Fiction Prize. Isa had participated in the criminal jury trial of four
Okinawan youths who had been accused of killing a drunken American
soldier. The youths were acquitted of murder in the trial in which Isa had
served as a juror.102
His advocacy for the reintroduction of jury trial in Japan attracted wideranging support from many civic activists and legal practitioners, as well as
journalists, legal scholars, high school teachers, college professors, and

98. See generally, MATTHEW J. WILSON, HIROSHI FUKURAI,
AND CIVIL JURY TRIALS: THE CONVERGENCE OF FORCES (2015).
99.
100.
101.
102.

& TAKASHI MARUTA, JAPAN

Id.
Id.
Wilson et al., supra note 98.
Id. See also, Colin Jones, Still Dreaming of a Japan with Juries: And Without U.S. Bases,
JAPAN TIMES, June 18, 2014.
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political organizers, among many others.103 Their collaboration and political
advocacy for the introduction of lay adjudication in Japan soon led to the
creation of two powerful grassroots organizations: “Baishin Saiban o
Kangaerukai” [Research Group on Jury Trial or RGJT] in Tokyo, and
“Baishin Seido o Fukkatsusuru-Kai” [the Organization to Bring Back the
Jury System or OBBJS] in Osaka, Japan.104 The RGJT was first established
in 1982 in order to foster and sustain “on the ground” civic discussions on
the jury trial and the possibilities for broader public participation in the
criminal justice process. The RGJT also held discussions to reduce the
wrongful conviction cases, due largely to the professional judges’ uncritical
attention to the authenticity of confessions. As mentioned earlier, the
Japanese professional judges paid little attention to whether or not
confessions were forcefully extracted from criminal suspects under extreme
physical and mental duress. The first RGJT meeting took place on April 2,
1982, in Hitotsubashi, Tokyo and was attended by legal scholars, practicing
lawyers, a journalist, a novelist, a former judge, young students, and other
civic activists who expressed grave concern about the integrity of the
Japanese criminal justice system.105 The RGJT decided to hold a monthly
study session and share the idea that the introduction of active civic
participation in the judge-monopolized, criminal trial process would insert a
much-needed transparency into the Japanese trial and help reduce, if not
eliminate, egregious wrongful conviction cases.106 The RGJT activity also
led to the creation of the Toban-Bengoshi Seido [the Rotating Public
Defender System] in 1993, an effort led by one of the RGJT founders,
Attorney and Professor Hideo Niwayama.107 This system was later
transformed into the Ho-terasu [Japan’ first Public Defender System] in
2006. Attorney Megumi Wada spoke of its socio-political significance in
providing vital legal assistance to the indigent people and communities in
Japan, including those who live in rural and remote areas.
The RGJT members also began to establish branch offices outside the
Tokyo metropolitan area, including the Kyushu Baishin Saiban o
Kangaerukai [The Kyushu Research Group on Jury Trial] in Kumamoto
Prefecture in Kyushu Island, Japan’s third largest island, and Niigata Baishin
Tomono Kai [The Niigata Friends of Jury Research Group] in Niigata
103. Hiroshi Fukurai, The Rebirth of Japan’s Petit Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury Systems: A
Cross-national Analysis of Legal Consciousness and the Lay Participatory Experience in Japan
and the U.S. 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 316 317-318 (2007).
104. Id. See also, “Baishin Seido o Fukkatsusuru-Kai” [“The Organization to Bring Back the
Jury System or OBBJS”] (hereinafter OBBJS) (last visited Nov. 25, 2019), available at
http://baishin.blog.fc2.com/.
105. Fukurai, supra note at 103.
106. Id.
107. Id., at 318.
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Prefecture in Central Japan.108 The key RGJT organizers also helped launch
another civic grassroots organization in 2002, Shimin no Saiban-in Seido
Tsukuro-kai [Citizens Committee for the Creation of the Saiban’in System
or CCCSS] in order to educate the public about the importance of civic
participation in the administration of justice.109 When the CCCSS was
created, the final architectural design for the specific numbers of professional
and lay judges in the Saiban’in panel was still to be determined. The RGJT
and CCCSS had sent numerous proposals to the Saiban’in Seido Keiji KentoKai [the Saiban’in System/Penal Matter Investigation Committee or SPMIC]
for what they considered to be the ideal composition of the mixed tribunal in
order to maximize the lay judge deliberation, including the proposal of one
presiding professional judge and eleven lay judges chosen randomly from
the community.110 SPMIC member Satoru Shinomiya, who was also a key
RGJT and CCCSS member, led the discussion on the ideal composition of
Saiban’in panel at the 24th meeting, on September 11, 2004.111 Shinomiya
suggested the introduction of the de facto structure of a criminal jury panel,
i.e., the possibility of eleven lay judges under the supervision of one
presiding judge.112 While his proposal was not adopted in the final design of
Saiban’in Seido, RGJT members’ continuous efforts to influence the
deliberation of public hearing, by petition submission and direct
participation, helped sustain important discussions on the idealized design of
the Saibain’in panel in order to maximize the democratic role of civic
participation in Japan’s criminal trial.
Another civic grassroots organization, “Baishin Seido o FukkatsusuruKai” [the Organization to Bring Back the Jury System or OBBJS], was
created in 1995 as a popular advocacy group to reinstate Japan’s oncesuspended criminal jury law. Chihiro Isa also played a pivotal role in the
creation of this civic organization in Osaka, which has maintained its own
radio program every Sunday morning, called “Donatteruno? Saiban Seido
[What’s Happening to the Trial System?] at Rajio Osaka [the Radio Osaka
Station]. They have continued to educate the public about the importance of
public transparency in criminal proceedings and popular participation in the
criminal trial. The civic organization has also become a strong advocacy
group for reinstating Japan’s jury law and reestablishing the all-citizen
criminal jury trial in Japan, insisting that the Japanese government’s own law
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. For the Saiban’in Seido, Keiji Kento-Kai, see Hiroshi Fukurai, Japan’s Quasi-Jury and
Grand Jury Systems as Deliberative Agents of Social Change: De-Colonial Strategies and
Deliberative Participatory Democracy, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 789 (2011).
111. Saiban’in Seido, Keiji Kento-Kai Meeting, Sept. 11, 2004, available at https://www.
kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/saibanin/dai24/24gaiyou.html.
112. Id.
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in 1943 had mandated its return after the war.113 The organization has also
been critical of the newly-adopted Saiban’in Seido, which allowed the
participation of professional judges in the deliberation process.114
The civic grassroots organizations in Tokyo, Osaka, and elsewhere have
been supported by a group of academic scholars, legal practitioners, civic
activists, political groups, crime victims, victims of wrongful convictions
and their families, among many other progressive sectors of civil society.
They have continued to invigorate public aspirations for the inclusion of lay
participation in the justice system and to promote the progressive democratic
ideals of direct participation and self-governance in Japanese society.115
Further, these organizations have continued to publish books and articles and
to hold successful symposia and seminars in order to sustain citizen-led
discussions on the importance of reintroducing the criminal jury system in
Japan.116
A. Jury Trials’ Lower Conviction Rate and Why It Matters
Several presenters at the UC Hastings Law School Symposium made
critical observations concerning Japan’s high conviction rates in criminal
cases. Many civic grassroots organizations in Japan believe that the
introduction of the all-citizen jury trial would help to significantly reduce, if
not eliminate, wrongful conviction cases, thereby lowering the conviction
rate from today’s near 100% to a much lower percentage, perhaps near 83%,
which was the conviction rate in criminal trials during the period from 1928
to 1943, when Japan operated an American-style, all-citizen jury trial. The
expectation of a lower conviction rate resulting from introducing the jury
trial in Japan is not unreasonable, especially given the high acquittal rate in
the criminal jury trials that took place in Okinawa from 1963 to 1971.
Although the number of jury trials in Okinawa was relatively small, the
analysis of the background of jury trials, the profile of defendants, attorneys
involved in trials, jury eligibility and selection, gender and cultural diversity
of jurors chosen, and verdict patterns all reveal the rich and significant
history of the jury trial. Jury verdicts have had important sociopolitical
113.
114.

OBBJS, supra note 104.
CHIHIRO ISA, SAIBAN’IN SEIDO WA KEIJI-JIKEN O KAERUKA: BAISHIN SAIBAN O
MOTOMERU RIYU [CAN THE SAIBAN’IN SYSTEM CHANGE THE CRIMINAL TRIAL? REASONS TO
DESIRE JURY TRIALS] (2006).
115. To understand the origin of these civic organizations, see CHIHIRO SAEKI, BAISHIN
SAIBAN NO FUKKATSU [THE RESURRECTION OF JURY TRIALS] (1996); CHIHIRO ISA, BAISHIN NO
FUKKATSU [REINSTATEMENT OF JURY TRIALS] (1996).
116. Hiroshi Fukurai & Valerie Hans, Special Feature: The Future of Lay Adjudication in
Korea and Japan, 3 YONSEI LAW JOURNAL 25 27 (2012). See also, Fukurai, supra note 103, at
319.

5 - Fukurai

422

7/29/2020 10:12 AM

Hastings Journal of Crime and Punishment

[Vol. 1:3

ramifications in Okinawan society. A total of nine jury trials—five criminal
and four civil jury proceedings—took place in Okinawa in the 1960s and
early 1970s prior to Okinawa’s ultimate reversion to Japan on May 15, 1972.
Jury research has revealed that Okinawa’s diverse juries returned an acquittal
verdict on a large number of indicted charges. The only exception is the first
criminal jury trial that took place in 1963, in which Japanese American
Bennett N. (Ken) Ikeda was accused of real estate fraud in Okinawa.
Okinawa’s first grand jury had indicted Ikeda on eleven counts of criminal
offense.117 He was found guilty on all counts by the criminal jury that
included both American and Okinawan residents serving as jurors.118
In the second criminal jury trial, U.S. v. Eiko Uehara Rose in 1963, the
defendant was indicted on seven criminal offenses, including various
charges of tax evasion. Eiko Uehara Rose, an Okinawa-born American and
the wife of an American army civilian on Okinawa, was also the owner of
the renowned restaurant, Teahouse of the August Moon (Hachigatsu Jugoya
no Chaya). The restaurant had been made famous by the 1956 Hollywood
movie under the same title, starring Marlon Brando, Glenn Ford, as well as
the prominent Japanese actress Machiko Kyo, who played the character of
Ms. Rose. At the jury trial, Ms. Rose was represented by an American
attorney who practiced law in the Philippines but had come to Okinawa to
represent her. She was cleared of six of seven indicted charges by the
criminal jury that included both American and Okinawan residents.119 In the
third criminal jury trial, U.S. v. Chosin Kishaba and Yoshifumi Arashiro, two
Okinawan men were charged with attempted murder, but the diverse jury,
which included American and Okinawan residents and a Philippine national,
acquitted both defendants of attempted murder. Arashiro was found guilty
of a lesser charge of assault and sentenced to thirty months in jail.120 The
fourth criminal jury trial, in 1964, U.S. v. Megumi, et al., involved four
Okinawan youths were accused of killing a drunken U.S. soldier. The diverse
jury, which included Chihiro Isa as one of three Okinawan jurors, returned a
verdict of not guilty on the murder charge for all four defendants. In the last
criminal jury trial, eighteen-year-old Michael Dickens was accused of four
drug-related offenses in 1971. He was found guilty on one account of
possessing marijuana, but received not guilty verdicts on three other
charges.121
A review of the indicted offenses that had been charged by the grand
117. U.S. v. Bennett Ken Ikeda, Grand Jury No.1, Reported & Filed Apr. 3, 1963 (the
indictment document on file with the author).
118. Id.
119. Wilson, et al., supra note 98.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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jury against criminal suspects in Okinawa reveals that the majority of them
had been cleared by the criminal juries that, again, included a wide spectrum
of the residential population in Okinawa, on the basis of race, ethnicity,
gender, citizenship, occupation, and national backgrounds.122 As stated
earlier, the jury qualification in Okinawa was extremely broad, for any
person who stayed on the island of Okinawa for three months was eligible to
serve. These so-called “indiscriminate,” “international,” or “multigendered” jury panels in Okinawa acquitted a large proportion of indicted
criminal defendants, among them Okinawans and an Okinawan-born
American. The rate of acquittals was much higher than that of Japan’s
previous criminal jury trials. The political background and cultural milieu
of Okinawa were quite different, of course, from those of the fascistic and
right-wing ideologies during Japan’s pre-war and WWII periods.123
Nonetheless, it is not difficult to speculate that the reintroduction of the oncesuspended jury trial in today’s criminal justice system in Japan could lead to
a much higher acquittal rate that of the bench trial or the Saiban’in trial.
If the suspended Jury Law were to be reenacted in today’s Japanese
society, however, it would have to be effectively modernized to function as
a democratic participatory system similar to the one previously adopted and
operated in the Island of Okinawa. For instance, the prewar jury had only
allowed the participation of male citizens who paid the annual tax of 3 yen
or more, and only 3% of the Japanese population was eligible to serve on the
jury.124 Japan’s Jury Law thus must be modernized to extend civic
participation to a broad spectrum of the population across lines of gender,
class, ethnicity, race, sexuality, and other social identities and categories.
The civic participation of women jurors in the justice system may be
particularly important, as jury research has substantiated that the addition of
women in jury trials has had a significant impact on conviction rates when
victims or defendants were women, in addition to bringing a multiplicity of
perspectives and life experiences into deliberative processes, thereby
enhancing the overall quality of jury deliberation.125 Women’s active
participation in jury trials in Okinawa might also have affected the trial
outcome, as they often dominated the jury panel and deliberation. For
example, in the third Okinawan criminal jury that tried Okinawan defendants
of Kishaba and Arashiro, women dominated the jury panel (7 of 12 jurors,
122. Id.
123. Saeki, supra note 115.
124. For the qualification of jury service, see Maruta, supra note 92.
125. See generally, Nancy S. Marder, Gender Dynamics and Jury Deliberations, 96 YALE L.J.
593 (1987). For the impact of English women in jury trial, see Shamena Anwar, Patrick Bayer,
and Randi Hjalmarsson, A Jury of Her Peers: The Impact of the First Female Jurors on Criminal
Convictions, 129 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL 603 (2019).
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i.e., 58%). The women-majority jury tossed out two Okinawan defendants’
attempted murder charge, while Arashiro was only found guilty of minor
assault. The jury’s international diversity was also significant in this trial,
including two Okinawan jurors; one was a married Okinawan woman, as
well as a Philippine national who was chosen as one of two alternates.126 The
jury diversity and active participation of women might also have had
significant influences upon the outcome of civil jury trials in Okinawa. A
total of four civil jury trials took place, and the plaintiffs in four civil jury
cases were all women, who were either a single mother or widow or both.
All of them filed civil lawsuits against powerful corporations, including U.S.
transnational corporations that operated their business in Okinawa, as well
as a local electric power company that was founded by Seiho Matsuoka, a
powerful Okinawan businessman and politician who later became the Chief
Executive Officer of the Government of the Ryukyu.127 In four civil jury
trials, Okinawa’s gender-diverse juries all ruled in favor of women plaintiffs,
awarding them hundreds of thousands of dollars in compensations.128 In the
last civil jury trial in 1972, the civil jury awarded the single mother more
than one hundred thousand dollars of compensatory damages.129
It is important to recognize that both civil and criminal jury trials in
Okinawa were characterized by jury diversity in gender, race, ethnicity,
social class, and national origin. On the other hand, jury service in the U.S.
mainland in the same period had not been hospitable to women, people of
color, indigenous people, the poor, and other marginalized and
underrepresented populations.130
It is remarkable that these same
marginalized populations from the U.S. had been encouraged to participate
in both civil and criminal jury trials in Okinawa. The active participation of
women jurors in Okinawa, in particular, shows a real contrast to women’s
participation in today’s Saiban’in trial. Although the most recent Japanese
census indicated that the majority of Japanese citizens were women, the
majority of Saiban’in participants have been men (55.1%).131
The analysis of the history of criminal jury trials in Japan in the 1930s
and 1940s, as well as both criminal and civil jury trials in Okinawa in the
1960s and 1970s, has shown that direct citizen participation in the
126. Make Legal History: Ryukyuans Face Twelve-Man Jury, STARS & STRIPES, Oct. 22, 1963.
127. Wilson, et al., supra note 98.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See generally, HIROSHI FUKURAI, EDGAR W. BUTLER, & RICHARD KROOTH, RACE &
THE JURY: RACIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE (1993).
131. Only 43.4% of Saiban’in participants were women. See Saiban’in Seido 10-Nen no
Sokatsu Hokokusho, Zuhyo 8: Saiban’in no Kosei (Seibetu) [Summary Report of Saiban’in System
for 10 Year Period], Chart 8: Saiban’in Composition: Gender] 34 (2019), available at http://www.
saibanin.courts.go.jp/vcms_lf/r1_diagram.pdf.
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administration of justice had powerful and significant impact on the trial
proceedings and the outcome of both criminal and civil trials. If Japan’s
criminal jury law were to be “awakened” today, Okinawa’s lessons show
that it is important to include the broadest possible societal participation in
the jury trial, including historically underrepresented and marginalized
populations, such as women, ethnic minorities, and those from working and
lower social classes.

IV. The Political Utility of PRC-Forced Indictment against
Foreign Soldiers
The final section of the paper focuses on the potential utility of the PRCforced prosecution of “state crime,” which is one of the most serious whitecollar crimes committed by the state and/or its actors in pursuant of the state
government’s orders and objectives. The last section also responds to
Professor Goodman’s suggestions to include legal professionals and political
advisors in the PRC’s adjudication of non-prosecution cases. While the state
or the national government typically serves as the agency of deterrence with
the tacit use of threat or effective deployment of punishment against criminal
offenders, the state and its agents are also capable of engaging in criminal
activities.132 Under international law, for instance, state crime may include
genocide, war crime, crimes against humanity, and crimes of aggression.133
Under national law, state crime is defined as the state’s activity or failure
to act that breaks the state’s own criminal law.134 Similar to the case of
white-collar criminals, where the secret ministerial directive and
governmental rules have prevented Japanese prosecutors from prosecuting
highly-privileged corporate executives, prominent politicians, and
government elites, there have also been groups of foreign nationals in Japan
who routinely victimize local residents and are not prosecuted. The law
adopted by the Japanese government has prevented public prosecutors from
prosecuting foreign nationals, even though their prosecution is mandated by
its own criminal law. As a result, the rights of crime victims and their
families have been systematically violated by the state government.
One specific legal mechanism that provides special “immunity” to

132. PENNY GREEN & TONY WARD, STATE CRIME (2000); see also, PENNY GREEN & TONY
WARD, STATE CRIME AND CIVIL ACTIVISM: ON THE DIALECTICS OF REPRESSION AND
RESISTANCE (2019).
133. See generally, CHARLES CHERNOR JALLOH & ILIAS BANTEKAS, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT AND AFRICA (2017).
134. DAWN ROTHE & CHRISTOPHER W. MULLINS, SYMBOLIC GESTURES AND THE
GENERATION OF GLOBAL SOCIAL CONTROL: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 2 (2006)
(the authors cited the work by Kramer & Michalowski (2005)).
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criminals is called the Status of Forces of Agreement (SOFA).135 Whether
or not the state’s granting of SOFA and the establishment of immunity for
foreign nationals who commit crimes, thereby fostering the culture of
impunity, should be considered as state crime is up for further debate and
discussions under state and international laws. Nonetheless, it is important
to recognize that the SOFA was originally designed to violate the
sovereignty of the state and its jurisdictional authority to punish foreign
nationals who commit crimes on foreign soils.136 Historically, the SOFA has
been used by powerful states and international organizations to shield from
foreign prosecution the criminal actions of their own personnel. By forcing
a foreign state to sign the SOFA, powerful international actors such as the
U.N. and the U.S. have routinely violated customary provisions of
international law and the sovereignty of the state by insulating the crimes
committed by their personnel from prosecution under local criminal law.
The SOFA also undermines the rights of crime victims and keeps their
grievances from being incorporated in the adjudication process. In 2017, for
instance, more than two thousand allegations of sexual abuse and
exploitation of children, women, and disabled or incapacitated civilians by
U.N. peacekeepers have been reported around the world.137 These personnel
were not prosecuted because the U.N. SOFA that governs U.N. missions
insulated their peacekeepers from criminal jurisdiction of the host country.138
On a similar note, in 2015, more than fifty Colombian girls had been sexually
abused by U.S. soldiers and civilian contractors, but they have never been
charged or prosecuted due to the SOFA immunity granted to U.S. military
personnel in Colombia.139
The concept of creating special “extraterritorial jurisdiction” was
developed along with the powerful state’s efforts to expand imperial
jurisdiction and colonies. For instance, the concept of SOFA and provision
of “extraterritorial rights” to U.S. soldiers overseas was advanced by U.S.
War Secretary Elihu Root who began to witness the sprawl of U.S. military
bases across the globe at the end of the nineteenth century. The U.S. invaded
Cuba, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines in 1898 and began to
establish U.S. military ports and base facilities in the North Atlantic and the
135. See generally, Hiroshi Fukurai, Lay Prosecution of U.S. Military Crimes in Japan by
Prosecutorial Review Commissions and the Saiban-in Trial, in JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: AN ERA
OF TRANSITION, (Harry N. Scheiber & Tom Ginsburg eds.) (2012).
136. Id.
137. Nimmi Gowrinathan & Kate Cronin-Furman, Rapists in Blue Helmets: The Crimes of UN
Peacekeepers, ENVIRONMENTALISTS AGAINST WAR, May 2, 2017, http://www.envirosagainstwar.
org/2017/05/02/rapists-in-blue-helmets-the-crimes-of-un-peacekeepers/.
138. Id.
139. Sibylla Brodzinsky, US Army Investigates Reports That Soldiers Raped Dozens in
Colombia, GUARDIAN, Apr. 7, 2015.
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Pacific Basins.140 Under Root’s leadership, the U.S. government also began
to develop the legal framework of bilateral and multilateral military
agreements in protecting U.S. armed forces from prosecution under domestic
and international laws while stationed in a foreign state. At present, the U.S.
government has signed more than one hundred Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA) and successfully placed military personnel in more than one
hundred and fifty countries across the globe.141
The U.S.-Japan SOFA signed in 1960 provided U.S. military personnel
“extraterritorial” immunity from prosecution under Japanese jurisdiction. In
Okinawa, where three-quarters of all the U.S. military bases in Japan are
stationed, for example, the failure of local government to punish criminals
had long created a culture of impunity among military personnel,
dependents, and civic employees, thereby fermenting the false liberty of
criminality that led to further victimization of local residents and
communities. From 1972 to 2015, military personnel have committed a total
of 574 serious and violent crimes against local residents, including 394
robbery cases (n=548 robbers), 129 rapes (n=147), 26 murders (n=34), and
25 arson cases (n=12) in Okinawa.142 For the five year period from 1964 to
1968 alone, U.S. military personnel and their dependents committed a total
of 5,376 crimes, including 504 serious and violent crimes in Okinawa.143
Okinawa has suffered from the continued victimization of local residents and
their communities, as a strong sense of impunity has been shared among
military personnel for many decades.
A. The PRC-Forced Prosecution of Military Personnel:
The Death of Yogi Koki
While the SOFA effectively prevents the prosecution of U.S. soldiers
under Japanese law, an exception occurred in Okinawa when the all-citizen
PRC decided to prosecute U.S. military personnel, reversing the Naha public
prosecutors’ non-indictment decision. Similar to the PRC decisions of
forced prosecution against white-collar criminals who had been long
140. For the historical background on the U.S. development of extraterritorial rights, see
Chalmers Johnson, Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (2004).
141. R. Chuck Mason, Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It, and How Has It Been
Utilized 2 (2015) (“The United States is currently party to more than 100 agreements that may be
considered as SOFAs”). See also, Defense Manpower Data Center, Number of Military and DoD
Appropriated Fund (APF) Civilian Personnel Permanently Assigned by Duty Location and
Service/Component (2019).
142. Fukkigo 574-Ken, Oinawa Beigunjin, Gunzoku Kyoaku Hanzai [Since the 1972 Reversion
to Japan, 574 Criminal Cases by U.S. Military Personnel and Their Dependents], RYUKYU
SHIMPO, May 20, 2016.
143. Id.
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protected by Japanese prosecutors and professional judges, PRC’s forced
prosecution decision in Okinawa punctured a huge hole in the culture of
impunity long enjoyed by U.S. armed forces personnel, dependents, and
civilian contractors.
In January 2011, a twenty-three-year-old military civic employee Rufus
James Ramsey III, who had consumed alcohol at the base party and was
driving back to his apartment, veered into an opposing lane and crashed into
a compact car driven by a nineteen-year-old Okinawan youth Yogi Koko,
killing him instantly.144 Ramsey was taken to U.S. Naval Hospital Okinawa
on Camp Lester and soon released. In March, the Naha public prosecutors
announced that they decided not to indict the civic employee, since the traffic
collision took place, according to the U.S. military, while he was on official
duty, citing SOFA’s Article 17, in which the American military exercises
primary jurisdiction over all accidents or crimes committed while on official
duty.145 The driver soon had his driving privilege suspended for the next 5
years.146 He was not tried in the military tribunal, as he was not a member
of U.S. armed forces.147 In Okinawa, DUI-related auto-accidents caused by
U.S. base personnel have not been uncommon. Between 1981 and 2016, a
total of 3,613 drunk-driving accidents were caused by U.S. military
personnel, resulting in 82 deaths and 4,024 injuries. Yet, the punishment
against drivers was almost nonexistent.148
This time, Yogi’s mother, friends, and concerned community members
had discussions with prominent Okinawan attorney Toshio Ikemiyagi, who
suggested that the mother and supporters might petition the Naha PRC to
review the non-indictment decision rendered by the Naha prosecutors’
office. Upon their request, Attorney Ikemiyagi then filed a petition on behalf
of the mother asking the Naha PRC to review the non-indictment decision.
In May 2011, the Naha PRC deliberated on the case and announced that the
indictment should have been issued in the first instance, reversing the
144. Japanese Man Died after Vehicle Collision with AAFES Employee on Okinawa, STARS &
STRIPES, Jan. 13, 2011 (hereinafter AAFES). See also, Beiheihanzai Fukiso ni Kogi [Protest
against Non-Prosecutorial Decision], AKAHATA SHIMBUN, Apr. 19, 2011. Drinking at USF
‘Official Event’ is Regarded as Party of ‘Official Duty’, JAPAN PRESS WEEKLY, Apr. 24 & 26,
2011.
145. AAFES, supra note 144.
146. Beigunzoku, Kisosoto Chiikyotei ga Hikokusekini [“Indictment is Proper” for Military
Employee: SOFA is on Defendant’s Seat], OKINAWA TIMES, May 29, 2011 (hereinafter
Beigunzoku).
147. Id.
148. Nihon Heiwa Iinkai [Japanese Peace Commission], Okinawa deno Beikaiheitaiin ni yoru
Inshuunten Shibojiko ni Kogisi, Beigunkichi no Tekkyo o Motomeru [The Elimination of U.S.
Military Bases in Okinawa Due to Drunk-Driving Accidents Resulting in Deaths and Injuries by
U.S. Marine Soldiers], Nov. 20, 2017, available at http://j-peace.org/2011/statement/pdf/insyu
jiko_kougi171120.pdf.
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prosecutors’ non-indictment decision.149
According to the new 2009 PRC law, after the PRC issued the indictment
decision, the local prosecutor’s office was required to respond to the PRC’s
decision within a three-month window. An unexpected event took place in
this case. First, the local prosecutors did not make an announcement of the
results of the reinvestigation of the case, as mandated by the new PRC law.
Second, in November 2011, the U.S.-Japan Joint committee, not the Naha
prosecutor’s office, made a sudden announcement on this case. The U.S.Japan Joint Committee is the bilateral panel charged with administering the
SOFA, largely in secret. Third, there was an unprecedented decision that, in
a period of peacetime, the military employee would not be protected by the
SOFA provision.150
Specifically, the U.S.-Japan Joint Committee announced that if a
member of the armed forces or a military-linked civilian is caught by
Japanese police while driving drunk, they would lose their “extraterritorial”
status under SOFA and Japan would have the right to exercise primary
jurisdiction, whether they were on or off duty. Secondly, since civilian
workers were not subject to the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ), they could not be tried in a U.S. military court. They must then be
tried in a civilian court and could be taken to the U.S. to be tried in a civil
court. Thirdly, if U.S. authorities determine the transfer to the U.S. to be
logistically impossible, the U.S. may decline to prosecute them. At that
point, Japan can formally request to try the case, and the U.S. is supposed to
grant a “sympathetic consideration” in handing the suspect to the Japanese
prosecutors.151 Lastly, the Japanese government would be allowed to
exercise the primary jurisdiction over such a case. Two days after the U.S.Japan Joint Committee’s announcement, the Naha prosecutors’ office issued
the indictment against the military employee, who was then arrested,
prosecuted, convicted in the Naha district court, and sent to Japanese prison
for 18 months for vehicular manslaughter.152
This PRC’s forced prosecution decision was significant and effective in
puncturing an unprecedented hole in the SOFA’s immunity provision for
military-related personnel. It is equally important to recognize the
importance of the PRC petition filed by the veteran Okinawan attorney on
behalf of the mother of the auto accident victim. In the petition submitted to
the PRC, Attorney Toshio Ikemiyagi had enlisted key legal decisions and
149. Id.
150. Okinawa Presec Indict U.S. Base Employee, HOUSE OF JAPAN, Nov. 25, 2011. See also,
U.S. Civilian Worker in Okinawa Indicted for Fatality, ASAHI SHIMBUN, Nov. 25, 2011.
151. Eric Johnston, SOFA A Source of Sovereign Conflicts, JAPAN TIMES, July 31, 2012.
152. Travis J. Tritten & Chiyomi Sumida, American on Okinawa Gets 18 Months in Prison for
Vehicle Manslaughter, STARS & STRIPES, Feb. 22, 2012.
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justifications in arguing that the military employee should be indicted and
prosecuted in Japan.153 First, he indicated that the U.S. Supreme Court in
1960 handed down the decision that during a time of peace, the SOFA
protection of military personnel would not be extended to civilian employees
of American military bases overseas. Specifically, the ruling in McElroy v.
Guagliardo in 1960 determined that during peacetime, the Uniform Code of
Military justice (UCML) could not be applied to civilian employees of U.S.
Armed Forces overseas in non-capital offenses. The ruling thus recognized
that different jurisdictional applications existed between U.S. Armed Forces
service members and civilian components of military personnel.154 Another
U.S. Supreme Court ruling, in Grisham v. Hagan in 1960, similarly
determined that, even in capital cases, different jurisdictional principles
could be applied to civilian employees overseas.155 Ikemiyagi’s PRC
petition had influenced the PRC deliberation, as the PRC’s Principal
Statement (giketsu no shushi) issued by the Naha PRC in May 27, 2011,
reversing the Naha prosecutors’ non-indictment decision, also cited these
two U.S. Supreme Court decisions.156
Second, the PRC Principal Statement had also cited other exclusionary
provisions of civil employees at U.S. military bases overseas. The PRC
statement cited that under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
SOFA provision, civic employees and dependent families of military
personnel were not considered to be protected under the NATO SOFA that
had been signed with multiple European countries.157 Third, the PRC
Principal Statement indicated that the Supreme Court of Korea had made a
similar decision on the limited coverage of jurisdiction over the civilians
employed in the U.S. military base in South Korea, in which the U.S. military
had no right to exercise its jurisdiction over civilian workers of American
military bases in South Korea during peacetime, as related to the 1960 U.S.
Supreme Court rulings.158
Lastly, as Ikemiyagi indicated in his PRC petition, which was re-cited in
the PRC Principal Statement, civilian employees at the military bases are not
members of U.S. military personnel, and their crimes were therefore not
subjected to adjudication by the U.S. Court Marshal, since the Uniform Code
of Military Procedure (UCMP) has jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel,
not civilian employees. The PRC then suggested that civic employees should
153. Personal interview of Attorney conducted by the author on Nov. 30, 2016, at his law office
in Naha, Okinawa.
154. McElroy v. United States ex rel Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
155. Grisham v. Hagan, 361 u.s.a. 278 (1960).
156. The PRC Resolution Statement, May 27, 2011 (on file with the author).
157. Beigunzoku, supra note 146. See also, Petition to Naha Prosecution Review Commission,
Apr. 25, 2011, filed by Attorney Toshio Ikemiyagi (on file with the author).
158. Beigunzoku, supra note 146.
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be properly subjected to the U.S.-Japan SOFA Article 17, section (1) (b),
which states that “the authorities of Japan shall have jurisdiction over the
members of USAF, the civilian component, and their dependents, with
respect to offenses committed within the territory of Japan and punishable
by the law of Japan.”159 The PRC Principal Statement thus concluded that
Ramsey, a civilian employee at a U.S. base, should be properly indicted and
tried in Japanese court. This whole process of turnaround from the
Okinawan youth’s death to the PRC’s prosecution decision took place
quickly, suggesting that the PRC had acted on the review of the petition
expediently and enthusiastically. The PRC’s pro-indictment decision was
prompt and decisive: the Okinawan youth’s death occurred on January 12,
2011; the petition to the Naha PRC was filed on April 25, 2011; and the PRC
decision that supported the indictment of a civilian employee was announced
on May 27, 2011.
B. The PRC’s Failure of Prosecution: The Death of Yoshio Onda
The PRC decision on the death of Yogi Koki due to the culpability of
civilian personnel and the prosecution in Japanese court stands in contrast
to another case of civilian death caused by a civic military employee that
took place in Yamaguchi Prefecture. In September 2010, 66-year-old
Yoshio Onda was killed by a car driven by civilian employee Jamie M.
Wallace, who worked at U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni in
Yamaguchi Prefecture. The Marine airfield military base is located at the
southwestern tip of Japan’s largest island, Honshu. Onda had been the
president of a neighborhood association and a key member of “Atagoyama
o Mamoru Kai [The Protection Group of Mt. Atago or PGMA],” who had
been protesting the construction of a 1,060-unit housing project on Mt. Atago
for U.S. military personnel next to the Marine airfield. The investigation of
the auto accident near the military base revealed that Onda’s body flew
nearly sixty feet, killing him instantly. The incident also took place without
any sign or trace of brake marks by the colliding automobile driven by
Wallace.160 Soon after the accident, nearby residents and witnesses of the
accident surrounded Wallace and her vehicle so that she would not escape
into the base.161
159. U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement, available at https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/
library/en/document/data/140220_2_opinion.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2019).
160. No to US Military Beef-Up in Post-Disaster Mess, JAPAN PRESS WEEKLY, May 17 & 18,
2011, available at http://www.japan-press.co.jp/modules/news/index.php?id=1854.
161. Iwakuni: Beigunzoku ga Jumin o Hanekorosu: Senryosha-Ishiki de Zochou-suru Beigun
[Iwakuni: Military-Related Personnel Killed Local Resident: Occupier-Minded U.S. Military],
JINMIN NO HOSHI [PEOPLES STAR], Vol. 5513, (2010), available at http://peoplestar.web.fc2.com/
list/data/5513-1.html.
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Onda’s life had been largely influenced by his war experience. Onda’s
father was killed in the Philippines during the Second World War, when he
was one year old, and one of his sisters and some cousins were killed by the
nuclear blast in Hiroshima in 1945. His mother had to take care of her family
by working at a nearby U.S. military base, and died when she was only 51
years of age.162 After the incident, the Yamaguchi prosecutors issued the
non-indictment decision because the accident took place while Wallace was
on official duty, and the administrative punishment was soon handed down
to Wallace, as her driving privileges were suspended for four months for
causing the deadly accident.163
After Onda’s death, his remaining family filed a complaint to the
Yamaguchi PRC to review the prosecutors’ non-indictment decision against
Wallace. The Yamaguchi PRC decided in March 2011 that the prosecutors’
original non-indictment was proper, stating “the accident took place while
on-duty. As indicated in the U.S.-Japan SOFA, the duty status properly gives
the U.S. government the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over the
accident, [thereby the non-indictment by the Japanese prosecutors was
proper].”164
There are a number of similarities between the deaths of Yogi Koki and
Yoshio Onda and the surrounding circumstances. First, their whole lives had
been deeply affected by the legacy of U.S. military bases that had been built
near their homes. Yogi Koki, who was originally born in Okinawa, had left
his family to work in Aichi Prefecture in the Island of Honshu, Japan’s
largest main island. He returned to his hometown in Okinawa to celebrate
his 20th birthday, which was considered the entry into adulthood according
to the local culture.165 Onda’s entire life had also been affected by his
relation to the legacy of U.S. military, including his father’s death, the U.S.
dropping of atomic bomb in Hiroshima, and his mother’s livelihood that
depended on jobs at a nearby U.S. military base. Second, they were both
killed by military civil employees, not U.S. Armed Forces service personnel.
Third, their deaths were not caused by their own actions or inaction, but were
externally imposed by drivers who were either under the influence of
alcohol, or perhaps, in the death of Yoshio Onda, driving carelessly, if not
recklessly. Fourth, in both cases, the U.S. military had held the primary
jurisdiction over both incidents and decided that civic employees were in the
162. Beigun Hanzai: Beigungunzokujiko Fukiso Izoku Kenshin Moshitate-e [Military Crimes:
Victim’s Family Filed Complaint to PRC], D-Navi, Apr. 10, 2011.
163. Tsutomu Niigaki, Yamachuchi-ken Iwakuni Deno Doshu Jijitsu [The Same Incident in
Iwakuni, Yamaguchi], Nichibei Chiikyotei-Kaisei o Jitsugensuru NGO [NGO for the Revision of
the U.S.-Japan SOFA], June 13, 2011, available at https://kaiteingo.ti-da.net/e3594968.html.
164. Id.
165. Japanese Man Dies after Vehicle Collision with AAFES Employee on Okinawa, STARS &
STRIPES, Jan. 13, 2011.
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furtherance of their own official duty when the deadly incidents occurred.
Fifth, in both instances, Japanese professional prosecutors issued the nonindictment decision, citing the U.S.-Japan SOFA provision and primacy of
U.S. jurisdiction over the incidents. Lastly, victimized families and their
proxies had filed complaints to local PRCs to review the propriety of the
prosecutors’ non-indictment decisions.
There are also significant differences in the outcome of PRC
deliberations in Okinawa and Yamaguchi prefectures. The Okinawa’s PRC
petition was prepared by an experienced lawyer who had been well-versed
in the “colonial” history of Okinawa which, according to Okinawan
specialists, has been made into a “sacrifice zone” by both U.S. and Japanese
governments.166 For instance, Attorney Toshio Ikemiyagi has represented
many families whose members have been victimized by U.S. military
personnel, including the late Koki Yogi and his grieving mother. He also
acted as a leader of many lawsuits filed by Okinawan residents against the
Japanese government and its U.S.-related polices in Okinawa. He is
currently the leader of the U.S. Kadena Air Base anti-noise pollution
litigation, representing approximately 22,000 Okinawan residents who live
near the base.167
The PRC petition on behalf of Yoshio Onda in Yamaguchi Prefecture
was filed by his remaining family members and their supporters who had
little legal background on the SOFA provision and little knowledge of
important legal decisions regarding the status of military-related personnel.
Similarly, the residents in Yamaguchi Prefecture have not faced the same
degree of exploitation and “forced victimization” of residents, communities,
environment, and ecosystems. Article 4 of SOFA stipulates, for example,
that U.S. government is not obliged to return the base and adjacent area to
“the condition in which they were at the time they became available to the
USAF, or to compensate Japan in lieu of such restoration.”168 Such a legal
provision has resulted in the contamination and destruction of the
environment and ecosystems of Okinawan villages and towns. The town of
Takaye, where Osprey helipad stations were recently constructed despite
strong opposition by the residents, had been used as a quasi-camouflaged
Vietnamese village during the Vietnam War. The residents were forced to
act as Vietnamese villagers during the military exercise simulation and had
the defoliant Agent Orange sprayed over them as well as food crops, so as to
166. See generally, ROGER GOODMAN & KURSTEN REFSING, IDEOLOGY AND PRACTICE IN
MODERN JAPAN 30 (1992) (Okinawans “see themselves made into a sacrificial lamb which the
emperor offered to the Allied Occupation to save the rest of Japan from prolonged occupation.”).
167. 22,000 File Suit Over Kadena Night Flights, JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 29, 2011.
168. SOFA, art 4, 1, available at https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/en/document/data/
140220_2_opinion.pdf.

5 - Fukurai

434

7/29/2020 10:12 AM

Hastings Journal of Crime and Punishment

[Vol. 1:3

investigate the impact of the herbicides.169 The villagers were never
compensated for the contamination of their farmlands or the health effects
stemming from their participation in the military simulation exercise.170
The Japanese government’s treatment of the deaths of both Yogi Koki
and Yoshio Onda demonstrated that the existing legal system has been
designed to elevate the interests of U.S. and Japanese governments and their
geo-strategic objectives over the rights and welfare of people, the nature, and
ecosystems in Okinawa and elsewhere. When Okinawan residents have been
victimized by military personnel, the decisions of the Japanese government,
including the prosecutors’ offices, have failed to ensure the safety and
security of local residents and their communities, while “ignoring” their duty
to punish the offenders. The reluctance of Japanese public prosecutors to
issue the indictment against civilian components of U.S. military reflected
the overall bureaucratic culture of the Japanese government, thereby
disregarding and marginalizing the rights of crime victims and their families.
In addition to the provision of the 1954 secret directive of shobun seikun, it
was also revealed that, in an attempt to prosecute U.S. military personnel,
Japan’s public prosecutors were required to follow the special instruction
from top ministerial officers, namely the Director of Public Prosecutors
(Kenjicho), Attorney General (Kenji Socho), and Justice Minister (Hosho).171 The directive thus led to the wholesale dismissal of criminal cases
that victimized local residents and communities in Okinawa and beyond.
The PRC then became an important legal vehicle with which to challenge
the culture of impunity and complicity.
C. Professor Carl F. Goodman’s Suggestion to Include “Mature
Adults” in PRC Deliberations
Georgetown Law Professor Carl F. Goodman offered an important
suggestion that, in order to engage in equitable and fair PRC deliberations,
it is important to invite legal specialists with politico-legal knowledge and
international expertise so that the PRC’s deliberations should be reflective
of, and incorporated into, a more consensual decision-making to comply
with the overall interests of the government and the general public. Professor

169. Lisa Torio, Can Indigenous Okinawans Protect Their Land and Water from the US
Military? As Construction Finishes on Six New Helipads, Demonstrations to Remove the Military
are Reaching a Fever Pitch, NATION, Dec. 20, 2016, available at https://www.thenation.com/
article/can-indigenous-okinawans-protect-their-land-and-water-from-the-us-military/.
170. Id.
171. Beihei-Kiso wa ‘Hoso-Shiki’ to Kitei: Homusho no 54-nen Naiki de [Requirement of U.S.
Soldiers’ Indictment Under Justice Minister’s Instruction: 1954 Internal Document of the Ministry
of Justice], SAGA SHIMBUN, Jan. 28, 2019.
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Goodman provides a number of compelling reasons that sociopolitical
experts should be included, in addition to lay participants, in PRC’s decisionmaking in the post-2009 era. For example, he warned that, without political
and legal experts, there might be a potential for partisan political abuse of
the PRC law, such as in the instance of what was most likely a politically
motivated request to review the non-indictment decision on DPJ Secretary
General Ichiro Ozawa.172 Professor Goodman suspected that the PRC-forced
indictment might have possibly cost Ozawa the Prime Minister post.173
Other reasons included the potential harm to national security when the
PRC-forced indictment led to the prosecution of foreign nationals. For
instance, the PRC-forced indictment of a Chinese ship captain could have
damaged the economic relationship with China, though he was quickly
released by the Japanese government.174 Another indictment of U.S. military
personnel had led to the violation of the jurisdictional authority of the U.S.Japan SOFA provision. According to Professor Goodman, “[M]andatory
indictment [of U.S. military-related personnel] could create an international
incident between Japan and its single most important military partner.”175
Other reasons he enlisted included the potential danger of damaging innocent
persons caught in the PRC investigation process176 and the tremendous stress
that the PRC process has placed on the rule of law, such as the indictment of
a former police deputy chief, when the statute of limitation had already
expired.177
Thus, Professor Goodman suggests the following changes in the PRC
law: (1) the training of PRC members with sample instructions prepared by
the Japanese Supreme Court’s Secretariat to explain the PRC’s need to
consider various issues, including the public interest and the rights of the
target of their investigation; (2) the more active involvement of public
prosecutors in providing the PRC exculpatory evidence involving the target
of their investigation; and (3) in PRC reviews that possibly touch upon
national security issues, the greater involvement of retired jurists of the
Japanese Supreme Court, a former head of the Japan Federation of Bar
Association, a retired Prosecutor General, a former Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and retired presidents of Japan’s national and private universities,
among others.178
172. See generally, Carl F. Goodman, Prosecution Review Commissions, the Public Interest,
and the Right of the Accused: The Need for a “Grown Up” in the Room, 22 PACIFIC RIM LAW &
POLICY JOURNAL 1 31, 32 (2013).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 33.
175. Id. at 35.
176. Id. at 33.
177. Id. at 33-34.
178. Id. at 42-43.
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These are important issues and agendas raised in order to improve the
deliberative performance and quality of the PRC decision-making.
Nonetheless, given the important civic oversight function of the PRC and its
current independent deliberative process, the possible inclusion of multiple
“mature adults” and their expert input in the deliberation may retard, if not
totally eliminate, the possibility of reflecting civic views, popular voices, and
citizens’ concerns related to the rights and interests of crime victims,
families, and general communities. As noted earlier, Japan’s overall
criminal justice system has demonstrated that judge-led trials have elevated
the rights and interests of the government, political authority, powerful
corporate entities, and foreign nationals above and beyond the rights and
interests of ordinary citizens, crime victims, their families and, overall, civil
society at large. In order to counter this long-standing situation, it thus seems
that the composition of the PRC should remain as an exclusive civic
institution, preserving its deliberative process without the participation of
government officials and legal experts, including public prosecutors,
professional judges, highly-placed government bureaucrats, and political and
academic experts.

IV. Conclusions
This paper has provided critical comments on the five invited scholars’
research presentations on the three new systems of popular and victim
participation in Japan’s criminal justice process, including: (1) the PRC's
new legally binding power to issue an indictment; (2) a mixed tribunal called
Saiban’in Seido with three professional and six lay judges as an adjudicable
body, and (3) a victim participation program that allowed crime victims,
families, and their proxies to express their grievances in the criminal justice
process.
This paper also incorporated the TEPCO case into the discussion of the
effectiveness of Japan’s new public and victim participation systems, and
explored the possibility of public adjudication of white-collar criminals, i.e.,
those in entrusted positions whose professional and corporate negligence led
to deaths and injuries. The ministerial secretive directive called shobun
seikun has long protected white-collar criminals and U.S. military personnel
from prosecution in Japanese court. Due to the government’s systemic
refusal to indict and prosecute them, a culture of impunity has been fostered,
leading to the continued victimization of ordinary citizens and communities.
The PRC, which was first created in 1948 to review the propriety of nonindictment decisions rendered by public prosecutors, became one of the rare
civic institutions in Japan whose membership was solely composed of
ordinary citizens randomly selected from the local community. Its

5 - Fukurai

Summer 2020]

7/29/2020 10:12 AM

Lay Judge and Victim Participation in Japan

437

deliberation was also conducted without the participation of government
elites and legal experts. The 2009 PRC law gave it the authority to issue a
legally-binding indictment decision. Among all PRC-forced indictment
cases since 2009, white-collar crimes have constituted the majority, with five
of nine cases (56%) and nine of thirteen defendants (69%). In the trials,
however, professional judges failed to convict a single PRC-indicted whitecollar defendant (0.0%).
This paper also explored alternative trial venues in which to try whitecollar crime, including PRC-indicted cases, such as a Saiban’in tribunal and
an American-style all-citizen, twelve-member jury, which Japan had once
operated from 1928 to 1943. This paper also examined the PRC-indictment
case in Okinawa, which led to the decision by the U.S.-Japan Joint
Committee to create the administrative exception in the SOFA’s “immunity”
provision, and ultimately allowed the prosecution of the civilian component
of U.S. military personnel in Japanese court. The PRC deliberation in
Okinawa was compared to another PRC decision in Yamaguchi Prefecture,
regarding the death of civilians at the hands of U.S. base personnel. The
creative use of the PRC decision and deliberation was explored in relation to
state crime, i.e., the state’s refusal to prosecute criminals, even when the
prosecution was mandated by its own national law. It is our hope that the
creative use of PRC and its legally binding indictment decision will
ultimately elevate the interests and rights of people, community, and civil
society at large over the rights and interests of government bureaucrats,
military personnel, corporate executives, political elites, and other potential
white-collar criminals.
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